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Ever since the United States was reconstituted after the Civil War,
a Confederate narrative of states’ rights has undermined the
Reconstruction Amendments’ design for the protection of civil rights.
The Confederate narrative’s diminishment of civil rights has been
regularly challenged, but it stubbornly persists. Today the narrative
survives in imprecise and unquestioning odes to state sovereignty.
We analyze the relationship, over time, between assertions of civil
rights and calls for the protection of local autonomy and control. This
analysis reveals a troubling sequence: the Confederate narrative was
shamefully intertwined with the defense of American chattel slavery.
It survived profound challenges raised by post-Reconstruction civil
rights claimants and by mid-twentieth century civil rights movements.
It reemerges regularly to pose questionable but unanswered challenges
to calls for national protection of civil rights. Our examination of the
Confederate narrative’s jurisprudential effects exposes an urgent need
to address the consequential but under-recognized tension between
human and civil rights in the United States on the one hand and local
autonomy on the other.
INTRODUCTION
Two narratives of our country’s post-bellum Reconstruction have
figured importantly in Supreme Court deliberations about civil rights:
a Confederate narrative1 and a People’s narrative. The Confederate
narrative is a story in which the states’ reunion after the Civil War
was a modest reform by which state-sanctioned slavery was ended,
but states’ rights were virtually unaffected. It is a story grounded in
the assumption that People’s rights are best protected by limiting

1. We use the word “Confederate” deliberately though we recognize it may
provoke unease. By stating that certain modern Court decisions continue the
Confederate narrative, we are not arguing that particular Justices or supporters of
particular opinions embrace the racist ideology of the historical Confederacy. We
recognize the value of principled defenses of decentralized enforcement power when
they are based on careful and context-specific thought about the optimal or just
allocation of particular kinds of civil rights decision-making authority. See, e.g.,
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism and Public Choice 10 (N.Y. Univ. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 114, 2009) (arguing that decentralization can improve
political “voice”); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Towards a Universal Field Theory of
National Private Rights and Federalism, 76 MONT. L. REV. 41, 52 (2015). We worry,
however, about uncritical adherence to the belief that decentralization of government
power is, in itself, an enhancement of the people’s liberty. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep.
Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
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federal power and protecting the power and independence of states.
The People’s narrative is one in which the nation rejected both slavery
and its assault on human dignity and altered its slavery-tolerating
Constitution to give the federal government power to protect the
People’s rights. It is a story involving guarantees of national
citizenship and national protection of citizens’ equal rights.
The states’ rights presumption underlying the Confederate
narrative has innocent sources: it echoes colonial resistance to British
tyranny, and it is bolstered by the psychological residue of times when
the perils of distant rule loomed large because interstate
communication and travel were so slow and arduous that the nation
seemed unworkably large and federal authority could seem
unworkably remote. Yet the Confederate narrative is notoriously
significant for having protected slave power, undermined the Civil
War Amendments, and justified Jim Crow subordination. Indeed, it is
now clear that under the banner of state sovereignty state
governments were complicit in the surveillance, harassment, and
murder of civil rights workers who dared to challenge segregation and
white supremacy.2 Although beaten back for a while during the Civil

2. The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission (MSSC) (1954) and the
Louisiana State Sovereignty Commission (LSSC) (1960) exemplify states’ persecution
of civil rights workers under the banner of local sovereignty. Both commissions were
reactions to federal mandates to overturn segregation, and particularly to the 1954
and 1955 Supreme Court rulings in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495
(1954) (holding segregation of public schools unconstitutional) and Brown v. Board of
Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (calling for desegregation “with all deliberate
speed”). Sarah Rowe-Sims, The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: An
Agency History, MISSISSIPPI HISTORY NOW (Sept. 2002), http://mshistorynow.
mdah.state.ms.us/articles/243/mississippi-sovereignty-commission-an-agencyhistory. The MSSC and the LSSC espoused states’ rights, with a particular focus on
maintaining the status quo in race relations. As an LSSC pamphlet proclaimed,
Louisiana should “never give up in our fight for the American Way of Life” and “[didn’t]
have to integrate [its] schools[.]” LOUISIANA STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION, DON’T
BE BRAINWASHED: WE DON’T HAVE TO INTEGRATE OUR SCHOOLS! (1960), available at
http://cds.library.brown.edu/projects/Freedom
Now/do_search_single.php?searchid=10061. Sovereignty Commissions and similar
bodies invoked the illegitimacy of federal control to downplay the salience of white
supremacist ideologies. JENNY IRONS, RECONSTITUTING WHITENESS: THE MISSISSIPPI
STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION 48 (1st ed. 2010). The MSSC characterized the Civil
Rights Act as “vicious and tyrannical legislation,” id. at 139, and Mississippi Governor
James P. Coleman argued that the civil rights bills were a violation of “sound
governmental principles” that were undermining the division of powers between the
federal and state governments. Id. at 48. The act creating the MSSC gave the agency
broad power to “do and perform any and all acts and things deemed necessary and
proper to protect the sovereignty of the state of Mississippi, and her sister states” from
“encroachment thereon by the Federal Government or any branch, department or
agency thereof; to resist the usurpation of the rights and powers reserved to this state
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Rights Movements of the last century, the Confederate narrative and
its underlying assumptions about the importance of states’ rights
persist to this day in discourse hostile to the People’s rights. 3
Although it has had a persistent influence in constitutional
discourse, the Confederate narrative rests on a distorted reading of
our legal history and encourages a narrow understanding of the rights
of constitutional personhood. We therefore advance what we call the
People’s narrative. This more historically grounded account holds that
Reconstruction changed the constitutional balance among federal,
state, and people power. Basic civil rights4—including the mutually

and our sister states by the Federal Government or any branch, department or agency
thereof.” Rowe-Sims, supra. Using these broad powers, the MSSC “engaged in
wiretapping, bugging, and other acts of espionage against Mississippi citizens[,]”
ultimately collecting “dossiers on ‘approximately 250 organizations’ and . . . ‘about
10,000 individual[s.]’” JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS IN MISSISSIPPI 60 (1994). With that information, the MSSC’s agents
penetrated the major civil rights organizations, informed police about planned
marches or boycotts, encouraged police harassment of African-Americans who
cooperated with civil rights groups, obstructed African-American voter registration,
and harassed African-Americans seeking to attend white schools. SPIES OF
MISSISSIPPI
(PBS
television
broadcast
Feb.
10,
2014),
http://proxy.lib.utk.edu:90/login?url=http://fod.infobase.com/PortalPlaylists.aspx?wID
=98092&xtid=58663 (access available upon request).
There is evidence that the MSSC was linked to both attempted and executed
assassinations. See Kevin Sack, Mississippi Reveals Dark Secrets of a Racist Time,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar 18, 1998, at A1 (describing an MSSC memorandum indicating
MSSC’s capacity to arrange the murder of Clyde Kennard, a black man who tried to
desegregate Mississippi Southern College.); Phillip Abbott Luce, The Mississippi
White Citizens Council: 1954-1959, at 90 (1960) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The Ohio
State University) (on file at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession
=osu1144847499&disposition=inline) (describing MSSC involvement in the shooting
of Gus Courts, a black man who refused to withdraw his name from the rolls of
registered voters, the assassination of Reverend George Lee, a black voter registration
activist, and the lynching of Mack Charles Parker, a black man awaiting trial for the
rape of a white woman); Dr. Horace Germany’s Sacrifice–1960-2010,
NEWSWIREHOUSTON (Sept. 1, 2000), http://newswirehouston.com/dr-horacegermany%E2%80%99s-sacrifice-1960-2010/ (describing an MSSC plan to “kill [a white
minister attempting to establish a seminary for black students] and scatter that socalled Bible College to the wind.”); see also, Sarah Rowe-Sims & David Pilcher,
Processing the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records, 21 THE PRIMARY
SOURCE 15, 18–23 (1999) (describing the 1977 class action suit that resulted in the
opening of the MSSC’s files); Louisiana State Sovereignty Commission, CIVIL RIGHTS
DIGITAL
LIBRARY
(Dec.
30,
2016),
http://crdl.usg.edu/export/html/mus
/sovcomfolders/crdl_mus_sovcomfolders_99-104-0.html?Welcome (compiling records
collected by the MSSC from correspondence with the LSSC between 1963 and 1967).
3. Contemporary Supreme Court cases that advance the Confederate narrative
(wittingly or unwittingly) are examined infra in Part IV.
4. We use the term “civil rights” to include both entitlements specified in the
Bill of Rights (like the right of free speech or religious choice) and entitlements (like
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reinforcing rights to be accommodated in public places, to be educated,
and to participate in the nation’s political life—became privileges of
the People, and the federal government became the ultimate judge
and protector of those rights.
The Founders’ accommodation to human chattel slavery
problematized the delineation of human rights. As we will show
below, the Confederate insistence on local control has been used to
justify slavery, Jim Crow subordination and toleration of the
subordination of women and sexual minorities. 5 Union victory in the
Civil War and Reconstruction might have established the primacy of
human rights over local control. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments and no fewer than five Reconstruction-Era
Civil Rights Acts declared the People’s rights and gave the federal
government power to protect them. Yet as federal authority was
asserted, the Confederate narrative was reasserted to valorize local
control, and Reconstruction was undone.6 As historian David Blight
has brilliantly shown, the excited post-war celebration of
emancipation and of newfound hope for a more egalitarian Union
were replaced over time by shock over the war’s carnage and
persisting belief in white supremacy.7 As a result, the South was
redeemed, and the nation was left with a dominant memory of
principled and valiant brothers ending a painful misunderstanding
with mutual respect and ponderous questions about the optimal
balance of state and federal power.8 In most of white America,
enthusiasm for freedom and equality was lost. 9
The Confederate narrative’s underlying assumptions about
history and the proper balance of sovereign power were not effectively
challenged again until the 1960s. During the 1960s, civil rights
protesters renewed the Reconstruction effort to transform popular
and official discourse about power and rights.10 They challenged the
dominant dichotomous view that only two powers count when it comes

an individual’s right of personal integrity, family autonomy, or public accommodation)
that are implicit in our traditions and our commitment to republican democracy.
5. See infra Parts II & IV.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See generally DAVID BLIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN
AMERICAN MEMORY 1 (2001) (providing a “history of how Americans remembered their
most divisive and tragic experience during the fifty-year period after the Civil War”).
8. See id. at 2.
9. See id. at 3.
10. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sits-Ins and the Role of
the Courts in the Civil Rights Movement, 33 L. & HIST. L. REV. 93 (2015).
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to rights–state versus federal.11 Civil rights protesters revived a
passion about the people’s national citizenship that had been
expressed by black Union soldiers when roughly 200,000 members of
the United States Colored Troops (USCT) marched “under USCT
numerals rather than state designations” as they and their families
“established themselves in a new and distinctive relationship with the
federal government.”12 Representing what civil rights activist Robert
Moses calls the “Demand Side” of civil rights, 13 civil rights protestors
argued that both nation and state exist to protect the People’s rights
and interests. 14 The argument for the People’s place in a triangle of
power posited the Fourteenth Amendment as a charter of people’s
rights.15 Rejecting Confederate accounts of post-Civil War history that
belittled the changes wrought by Reconstruction, civil rights activists
called for strong and double-barreled interpretation of the federal and
state governments’ simultaneous obligations to the People.16
Although the Supreme Court often ruled in ways that were favorable
to the cause of civil rights, the Court never came to terms with the
contradictions between the Confederate narrative and protection of
the People’s rights.17
The Court’s failure to confront the Confederate narrative in the
manner advocated by 1960s civil rights activists has been
consequential. Confederate valorization of local control has quietly
reemerged in our modern constitutional discourse. It has surfaced

11. Id. at 99 (“The student sit-in movement of 1960 was transformative on a
number of levels. It reshaped and reinvigorated the struggle for racial equality. The
sit-ins marked a new phase of the Civil Rights Movement, one in which mass
participatory direct-action protest would become the leading edge of the movement's
demand for social and political change.)
12. J. Matthew Gallman, Foreword to RONALD S. CODDINGTON, AFRICAN
AMERICAN FACES OF THE CIVIL WAR: AN ALBUM, at ix, xv (2012) (suggesting that as
the USCT “marched under the federal flag . . . their ties to the federal government
were more explicit than those of their white comrades, who fought almost exclusively
in state-numbered regiments.”).
13. Math as a Civil Rights Issue: Working the Demand Side, HARV. GAZETTE
(May 17, 2001), http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2001/05/math-as-a-civil-rightsissue/.
14. Schmidt, supra note 10, at 112-13.
15. We borrow the concept of triangulation from Laurence H. Tribe,
Commentary, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. REV. 957, 957-61 (1973–74). Tribe
emphasized the conceptual value of thinking separately but simultaneously about an
utterance, the belief of the utterer, and the conclusion the utterance would urge. Id.
at 958. We emphasize the conceptual value of thinking separately and simultaneously
about the possessor of a right and the bodies responsible for defining and enforcing it.
16. Christopher W. Schmidt, Conceptions of Law in the Civil Rights Movement,
1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 641 (2011).
17. See infra Part III.
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with disturbingly little contestation in cases involving gender-based
violence18 and justifying voting rights retrenchment.19 The narrative
has framed key debates over separation of powers20 and animated
dissent over recognizing the rights of sexual minorities. 21 In each of
these contexts, the Court has been encouraged to belittle
Reconstruction’s significance and utter unquestioning odes to state
sovereignty.22
The claims set out above rest importantly on our understanding
of the concept of narrative. Before elaborating those claims, we pause
to explain what we mean by “narrative” and how the concept guides
our analysis. We use the term “narrative” in its technical sense. A
narrative features “a cast of human-like characters” interacting in a
plot.23 Plots unfold along a timeline where “an initial steady state . . .
[is] disrupted by a [t]rouble.” The trouble “evok[es] efforts at redress
or transformation, which succeed or fail, . . . so that the old steady
state is restored or a new . . . steady state is created[.]”24 Through this
simple ordering, narratives construct meaning in a discourse:
inexplicable events are reconstructed as straightforward stories;
random facts are made coherent; ambiguous statements are
reinterpreted as connected propositions.25 Narrative theory helps
explain the discursive meaning of judicial opinions. Buried within
judicial opinions, one can find stories with beginnings (steady states),
middles (troubles generating responses), and ends (redress or
transformation). 26
Viewed through a narrative lens, judicial opinions do more than
decide concrete disputes between parties and establish abstract
principles for deciding future cases. Opinions also rely on and advance
narratives that help the author of, and the audience for, the decision
to translate abstract ideas into familiar and socially resonant
concepts. These narratives are not mere rhetorical flourishes. Long
after the holding and precedential rule of the case have evolved, been
overturned, or been made irrelevant by the passage of time, the
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000).
19. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2632 (2014).
20. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
21. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2611–26 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 113 (2000)
(emphasis omitted).
24. Id. at 113–14 (emphasis omitted).
25. See id. at 115 (dramatizing a story’s ability to be more than “the sheer
transfer of information”).
26. See id. at 113.
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narrative elements of the case will often retain their persuasive
power.
We understand the Confederate narrative as an enduring story in
which states’ sovereignty is the steady state, federal power is the
trouble, and squelching federal power is the happy ending. In that
telling, states’ rights are the doctrinal lodestar or constitutional true
north. The People’s narrative, on the other hand, is one in which
liberty ordered by respect for national human rights norms is the
steady state, infringement of that ordered liberty is the trouble, and
enforcement of the norms is the happy ending. In that telling, respect
for human dignity is the lodestar. In the sections that follow, we trace
the alternating power of the Confederate narrative’s calls to protect
state sovereignty and the People’s narrative’s calls to protect the
people’s liberty as a matter of respect for human dignity.27
As it happens, the People’s narrative has so far found its most
fulsome expression in overlooked dissents—especially those of the
first Justice Harlan 28 and of Justice Douglas.29 Justice Douglas once
wrote, quoting Chief Justice Hughes, that “[a] dissent in a court of last
resort is an appeal to the brooding spirit of the law[.]”30 Our account
of the ebbs and flows of the Confederate and People’s narratives is
thus an account of judicial brooding over time in majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions.
The remainder of the Article proceeds as follows: In Section II, we
map the Confederate narrative’s influence on the Court’s early
resistance to Reconstruction’s enhancement of federal power, and the
emergence of a People’s narrative in the judicial brooding that
resistance generated. In Section III, we trace the play of Confederate

27. In our quest to uncover the essential lines of the Confederate and People’s
narratives, we have benefited from the use of a tool developed by our colleague Colin
Starger—the SCOTUS Mapper. The Supreme Court Mapping Project, UNIV. OF BALT.,
(Dec. 13, 2016) http://law.ubalt.edu/faculty/scotus-mapping/ [hereinafter the SCOTUS
Mapper]. This tool helps researchers discover and visually represent the influence of
separate opinions in non-unanimous Supreme Court cases. We have mapped the
competing lines of cases discussed in this Article using the SCOTUS Mapper. These
maps are accessible through the interactive links infra in Appendix B or at The
Persistence
of
the
Confederate
Narrative,
IN
PROGRESS,
http://blogs.ubalt.edu/cstarger/beyond-confederate-narrative/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2017, 9:56 PM).
28. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20–38 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
29. See United States v. Williams (Williams I), 341 U.S. 70, 87 (1951) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); United States v. Williams (Williams II), 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
30. William O. Douglas, The Dissent: A Safeguard of Democracy, 32 J. AM.
JUDICATURE SOC’Y 104, 106 (1948) (quoting Chief Justice Hughes).
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and People’s narratives in renewed brooding over federal power that
was triggered when 1960s civil rights activists revived antislavery
ideologies to assert the People’s rights to public accommodation and
political participation. Section IV examines more recent opinions and
notes the continuing power of the Confederate narrative and the
inexplicable silencing of the competing People’s narrative. Section V
concludes and offers a resource for readers who wish to continue or
critique our inquiry: an interactive “map” of significant cases,
statutes, and events discussed in the preceding sections. 31
I. RECONSTRUCTION: ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM CONCEIVED
AND ABORTED
The United States Supreme Court has never answered the central
constitutional question posed by the Reconstruction Amendments:
Did the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments reconstruct the original constitutional order to establish
a national charter of civic freedom? Or did they outlaw slavery and
reintegrate the former Confederate states without significant change
in the People’s rights or the balance of state and federal powers?
Between its 1871 decision in Blyew v. United States,32 when the
Court considered for the first time the reach of federal power under
the Reconstruction Amendments, and its 1906 ruling in Hodges v.
United States,33 when it unequivocally declined to read the
Reconstruction Amendments as granting a markedly greater role for
the federal government in the protection of individual rights, the
Court issued no fewer than thirteen decisions in which it grappled
with the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments and Congress’s
power to enforce them.34 In some of these rulings, the Court conceded
that the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments intended at least
to invalidate state laws or state actions that explicitly discriminated

31. See The Supreme Court Mapping Project, supra note 27. This tool was
instrumental in tracing the Confederate and People’s narratives in majority and
dissenting opinions across time.
32. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 591–95 (1871).
33. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 14–15.
34. Id. at 1; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664 (1884); The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. at 3; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1882); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386 (1880); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 373 (1879); Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 317 (1879);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 554 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875); The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 58 (1872); Blyew, 80 U.S. at 581.
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against African-Americans. 35 Nonetheless, a majority of Justices
remained steadfastly unwilling to consider the far more significant
question whether the Amendments created new federal rights and
federal responsibilities to enforce those rights against both state and
private action.
The one remarkable exception is a pair of dissents by Justice
Harlan in The Civil Rights Cases36 and in Hodges,37 in which he
showed that the Reconstruction Amendments, taken together, created
a new national charter of civil freedom belonging to American
citizenship, and subject to national enforcement. 38
In the subsections that follow, we trace the Confederate narrative
in the majority’s pronouncements between 1871 and 1907 on federal
power to delineate and enforce civil rights and then review Justice
Harlan’s articulations of the People’s narrative–both in his wellknown dissent in The Civil Rights Cases39 and in his oft-neglected
Hodges40 dissent.
A. The 1787 Constitutional Order Reconstructed
Victory at Appomattox heralded passage and ratification of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and passage of a
set of legislative measures to support the Reconstruction project.
Freedmen Bureau Bills, passed in 1865 and renewed in 1866,
attempted to address the welfare of millions of men, women and
children “come into a new birthright, at a time of war and passion, in
the midst of the stricken, embittered population of their former
masters.”41 More importantly for our purposes, Congress passed four
measures to safeguard the rights associated with the citizenship that
was now a right of birth in the United States.
First, Congress enacted what we refer to as the Citizenship Act42
(more commonly known as the Civil Rights Act of 1866) which
reiterated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of birthright

35. Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. at 664; Neal, 103 U.S. at 397; Ex Parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345–46; Rives, 100 U.S. at 318; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
36. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
37. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38. Id.; The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
39. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40. Hodges, 203 U.S. at 20 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, The Freedmen’s Bureau, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar.
1901,
at
354,
357,
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com
/past/docs/issues/01mar/dubois.htm.
42. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 1–3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 242 (2006)).
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citizenship and went on to specify that, regardless of color, citizens
had the rights to enter contracts, sue, present evidence in court, buy,
hold, and sell property, and enjoy all the benefits of the laws
theretofore enjoyed by white persons.43 Additionally, the Citizenship
Act made it a federal crime to deprive any person of the rights it
protected and created removal jurisdiction in federal courts when civil
rights enforcement was denied or precluded in state courts.44
In 1870 Congress passed the Enforcement Act (also known as the
Force Act), which reenacted the Citizenship Act, 45 affirmed the
Fifteenth Amendment’s right to vote without regard to color, provided
for the use of federal troops to protect the right to vote, and added a
new catch-all criminal conspiracy provision, making it a felony for two
or more persons to conspire with the intent to violate the provisions
of the Act or to prevent citizens from exercising or enjoying any right
or privilege granted under the Constitution. 46
By 1871, it was clear that more was needed. Citing “overwhelming
evidence that through tacit complicity and deliberate inactivity, state
and local officials were fostering vigilante terrorism against politically
active blacks and Union sympathizers,” President Grant requested
emergency legislation to quell rampant Southern violence that states
were unwilling or powerless to control.47 In response, Congress passed
the Ku Klux Klan Act.48 As compared to the Force Act, the Klan Act
extended federal civil rights protection in two significant ways. First,
whereas the substantive civil penalties of the Force Act were aimed
at violations of the act itself, the Klan Act created civil penalties for
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution by persons acting under color of state law. 49 Second, the
Klan Act used and expanded language from the catchall conspiracy
section of the Force Act, to make it a federal crime to conspire to
deprive persons or classes or persons of any rights granted by the

43. Id. at § 1.
44. Id. at §§ 2, 3.
45. Reenactment was thought necessary to claim or clarify the authority of the
newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment. See Boyd A. Byers, Adventures in Topsy-Turvy
Land: Are Civil Rights Claims Arising Under 42 U.S.C. § 1891 Governed by the Federal
Four-Year “Catch-All” Statute of Limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 1658, 38 WASHBURN L.J.
509, 513 (1999).
46. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1971, 1981, 1987–1991 (2012)).
47. Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133, 1153 (1977).
48. Id.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)).
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Constitution or the equal protection of the laws.50
Finally, in 1875, Congress responded to Jim Crow segregation by
enacting what we will refer to as the Public Accommodations Act,
requiring all inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of
public amusement to open their accommodations without regard to
race, color or previous condition of servitude.51
According to the People’s narrative, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteen Amendments and the Citizenship, Force, Klan and Public
Accommodation Acts were to have been the constitutional and
legislative spine of Reconstruction’s program to establish a national
charter of the People’s rights. Taking that view of history, one would
have to say that between 1871 and 1907, Supreme Court rulings
crippled Reconstruction’s multi-racial and egalitarian project. As we
demonstrate below, with each crippling blow, the Court sounded the
Confederate claim that whatever their language or history, the
Reconstruction Amendments did not carve out a strong role for the
federal government in defining and protecting civil rights, but worked
only a narrow reform of the 1789 constitutional order.
B. Early Supreme Court Interpretation: The 1787 Constitutional
Order Restored
Although Slaughterhouse is properly known as the Supreme
Court’s first interpretation of the meaning and reach of any of the
Reconstruction Amendments, it was not the first case in which the
Court took the measure of federal power after secessionist Civil War
and reunification. Blyew v. United States,52 decided a year earlier, was
the first in a series of challenges to federal prosecutions for acts of
supremacist terror. The facts of Blyew are representative. The case

50. While the Klan Act’s Section 2 criminal conspiracy provisions were quite
similar to the equivalent provision in Section 6 of the Force Act, the language of the
Klan Act covered a broader range of conspiratorial acts than the Force Act. For
example, the Klan Act made it a criminal offense for two persons to conspire “to
overthrow, or to put down, or to destroy by force the government of the United States,
or to levy war against the United States, or to oppose by force the authority of the
government of the United States, or by force, intimidation, or threat to prevent, hinder,
or delay the execution of any law of the United States . . . .” Id. at § 2 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012)).
51. Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335, 336. Violations of the Public
Accommodations Act were made punishable as misdemeanors, and persons injured by
violations of the Act were given the right to recover civil judgments of $500 for each
offense. Id. at § 2. A genealogy of the Reconstruction legislation described above,
tracing fragments that survive today, appears as Appendix A.
52. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581 (1872).
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involved the federal prosecution of two white men for the axe murders
of four members of a black family: a ninety-seven-year old
grandmother, the mother, the father, and a seventeen-year old boy.53
The only eyewitness account linking the defendants to the crime was
the dying declaration of the seventeen-year old boy.54 At the time,
black people were only competent to testify in Kentucky courts
against other blacks, and this preclusion encompassed the dead boy’s
declaration.55 The Citizenship Act authorized federal prosecutors to
remove cases to federal courts when the “affected persons” whose
citizenship rights had been denied could not obtain redress in state or
local courts.56 Relying on that authorization, and citing the
inadmissibility of the young victim’s dying declaration, the United
States indicted and convicted the alleged axe murderers in federal
court.57 The defendants appealed, arguing that the federal
government had exceeded its enforcement power. 58 Positing the
Confederate narrative’s link between states’ rights and people’s
freedom, they argued that the Court’s decision would be “felt in its
influence on the destinies of the country” beyond the Justices’
lifetimes, for it would “draw the line of demarcation between the
powers of a great central government on the one hand and the local
rights of self-government retained to the States and the People on the
other.”59
The Supreme Court overturned the defendants’ convictions, but it
declined their invitation to treat the case as a clash between federal
and state power.60 Establishing a pattern of avoidance that recurs
regularly, both in the early cases addressed in this section and in the
mid-twentieth century era of civil rights protest addressed in the next
section, the Court avoided reaching constitutional questions of state

53. Id.
54. The only survivors of the attack were a thirteen-year old girl who was
brutally hacked, and her ten-year old sister who was hiding in the family’s one-room
cabin. Id. at 585.
55. Id. at 592.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §§ 2, 3, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012)).
57. Blyew, 80 U.S. at 583–84.
58. Id. at 584.
59. Jeremiah Black, Argument for Kentucky, Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581
(1872), reprinted in CHAUNCEY F. BLACK, ESSAYS AND SPEECHES OF JEREMIAH S.
BLACK WITH A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 539 (1885).
60. See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 591 (viewing the question before it as one of statutory
interpretation instead).
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and federal power by deciding the case on the basis of a technicality.61
Here, as in subsequent cases we will describe, the avoidance by
technicality move seems questionable. Nonetheless, Blyew can be said
to have “afforded the Supreme Court with its earliest opportunity—
an opportunity that it used—to begin the substantial devastation of
the federal government’s civil rights powers that followed over the
next generation.”62
Slaughterhouse was the Court’s next–and its first direct–address
of the post-Reconstruction balance of state and federal power with
respect to civil rights, and in it the Confederate narrative sounds
loudly. Slaughterhouse is a case full of vexing ironies. It involved a
claim brought by opponents of Reconstruction who calculated relying
on the Reconstruction Amendments to challenge acts of Louisiana’s
multi-racial Reconstruction legislature.63 Moreover, it was decided by
a Court packed with Republican supporters of Reconstruction’s civil
rights agenda.64 Nonetheless, it resulted in a radical limitation of
federal power to enforce that agenda.65
The well-known story is that New Orleans butchers sued to
invalidate a Louisiana statute regulating the slaughtering of animals
within city limits.66 The butchers argued that the statute, which
compelled them to use a state-chartered slaughtering facility, violated
nearly every freedom the Reconstruction Amendments were designed
to protect: It exacted involuntary servitude; it abridged privileges and
immunities of their citizenship, and it denied them equal protection
and due process of law.67 The “black and tan”68 Louisiana legislature

61. Framing the question before it as one of statutory interpretation, the Court
reasoned that “affected” persons within the meaning of the Citizenship Act were
limited to parties to an action. Id. at 594.
62. Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Judicial Theme, 41 STAN. L. REV.
469, 474 (1989).
63. RONALD M. LABBÉ & JONATHAN LURIE, THE SLAUGHTERHOUSE CASES:
REGULATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 126 (2005); see
MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF SHATTERED DREAMS: SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND
THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE CIVIL WAR ERA 198–200 (2003).
64. ROSS, supra note 64, at 201.
65. See id. at 200 (noting that Judge Miller’s narrow interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause prevented “the federal
government [from having] greater powers to protect the civil and natural rights of
African-Americans from discriminatory and violent acts”).
66. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 43 (1872).
67. Id. at 43–44.
68. “Black and tan” was commonly used to describe racially integrated
legislatures during the Reconstruction Era. Richard L. Hume, Carpetbaggers in the
Reconstruction South: A Group Portrait of Outside Whites in the “Black and Tan”
Constitutional Conventions, 64 J. AM. HIST. 313, 313 (1977).
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countered that the statute was a legitimate exercise of the state’s
police power, designed to rid New Orleans of persistent plagues
caused by the unregulated dumping of butchering waste. 69
The Court recognized that it had been called on to gauge the effect
of the Reconstruction Amendments on the 1789 Constitution and that
nothing so consequential had been brought to them during any of the
Justices’ tenures.70 It acknowledged that by enacting and ratifying the
three Reconstruction Amendments the nation “recur[red] again to the
great source of power in this country, the people of the States”71 in
order to secure “additional guarantees of human rights; additional
powers to the Federal government; [and] additional restraints upon
those of the States.”72 But, the Court hastened to add that the
amendments were also part of a “process of restoring to their proper
relations with the federal government and with the other States those
which had sided with the rebellion[.]”73 The Justices were bound,
then, to balance respect for the momentousness of an amendment
process that altered the state and federal balance of power in defense
of human rights against the need for “proper” restoration of the
powers of states that had been in rebellion. The Justices did so by
emphasizing the narrower goal of ending human chattel slavery
rather than the larger goal of protecting human rights. 74 Harking
back to the 1867 Constitution rather than its post-Civil War
reconstruction, the Court reasoned that the privileges and immunities
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were limited to those few
that flowed uniquely from national citizenship.75 The definition and
protection of basic civil rights were therefore left to the various
states. 76 Underlying this interpretation was the strong suggestion
that the Reconstruction Congress and the ratifying states acted
“[u]nder the pressure of . . . excited feeling” and therefore neglected,

69. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 62.
70. Id. at 67 (“No questions so far-reaching and pervading in their consequences,
so profoundly interesting to the people of this country, and so important in their
bearing upon the relations of the United States, and of the several States to each other
and to the citizens of the States and of the United States, have been before this court
during the official life of any of its present members.”).
71. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 67–68.
73. Id. at 70.
74. See id. at 71 (noting that the “pervading purpose” of the Amendments was
the “freedom of the slave race”).
75. Id. at 74.
76. Id. at 77 (concluding that it was not “the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment . . . to bring within the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights
heretofore belonging exclusively to the States”).
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rather than recalibrated, the balance of state and federal power.77
Slaughterhouse is fascinating because it stood civil rights
discourse on its head, with customary civil rights proponents on the
side of state autonomy and customary opponents on the side of federal
intervention. In putting autonomous behavior in marketplaces under
an individual rights umbrella, it encouraged commercial actors to
take the Reconstruction Amendments as a shield behind which
business enterprises arguably have come to benefit more from
Fourteenth Amendment protections than more traditional targets of
discrimination or oppression. 78 Blyew was the more traditional civil
rights case, and, as we have indicated, post-Slaughterhouse it was
followed by a string of similar cases in which federal authorities
attempted to combat supremacist exclusion and terror, and the Court
ruled that they lacked authority to do so. United States v. Cruikshank
was the next such case, and it brought the Court to take a direct
stance on the question of federal power to prosecute cases of anti-civil
rights terrorism.79
After Louisiana’s 1872 gubernatorial election, two candidates
declared victory: William Pitt Kellogg, a Republican and supporter of
Reconstruction and John McEnery, a Democrat and former
Confederate commander.80 While the disputed election made its way
through the federal courts, each camp attempted to appoint local
officials. 81 In the parish that included Colfax, Louisiana, both sides
made judicial appointments, and freedmen gathered in the parish
courthouse to support and protect the Republican appointees. 82 In
what came to be known as the Colfax Massacre, three hundred white
men, most mounted on horseback and armed with rifles, set fire to the
courthouse, and killed more than three hundred freedmen as they
tried to surrender.83

77. See id. at 82
78. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 89–90 (1938) (Black, J.,
dissenting) “[O]f the cases in this Court in which the Fourteenth Amendment was
applied during the first fifty years after its adoption, less than one-half of one per cent.
invoked it in protection of the negro race, and more than fifty per cent. asked that its
benefits be extended to corporations.”).
79. See CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 229–49 (2008).
80. Id. at 13.
81. Id. at 13–14.
82. JAMES K. HOGUE, UNCIVIL WAR: FIVE NEW ORLEANS STREET BATTLES AND
THE RISE AND FALL OF RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION 107–08 (2006).
83. See id. at 109–11 (giving a detailed account of the battle and massacre at
Colfax).
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The State made no effort to prosecute the white assailants.84 The
United States indicted several assailants under the Force Act
charging that they had conspired to deprive the murdered freedmen
of their civil rights.85 The Court held that Congress exceeded its
powers when it authorized federal enforcement of what the Court
regarded as state-granted rights.86 It therefore dismissed all of the
federal changes.87 In doing so, it offered an analysis of the
constitutional balance between state and federal power that has been
repeated so often by subsequent courts that it has come to sound (and
to serve) as a statement of faith about the proper role of the federal
government in defining and protecting the People’s rights—a
catechism to be repeated without question or doubt.88 One might call
it the Cruikshank creed.
The Cruikshank creed incorporates the major themes of the
Confederate narrative. Its tenets are that before the Union was
formed, the People granted power to the various states. 89 In 1787, the
States surrendered very limited powers to a federation. Powers not
surrendered to the federation remain exclusively with the states, 90

84. Following the massacre, white Democrats let loose a reign of terror over the
county so as to foreclose any possibility of local prosecution. See LANE, supra note 79,
at 129 (describing a “new campaign to kill or expel Republicans”). When United States
Attorney James Beckwith brought charges against the defendants under the Force
Act, jurors and witnesses were physically intimidated and even violently attacked. Id.
at 151–53 (detailing the murders of several witnesses to the Colfax Massacre); see
HOGUE, supra note 82, at 115 (2006) (noting that after the Colfax Massacre, black men
willing to stand up to white pressure received a “never-to-be-forgotten message to stay
away from politics altogether”); LEEANNA KEITH, THE COLFAX MASSACRE: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF BLACK POWER, WHITE TERROR, AND THE DEATH OF
RECONSTRUCTION 119 (2008) (noting attempts on the lives of the local district attorney
and a local African-American judge in response to the Colfax indictments).
85. At trial, a mostly white jury convicted three defendants of violating section 6
of the Force Act. For purposes of appeal, Justice Joseph P. Bradley, riding circuit in
New Orleans, joined Circuit Judge William B. Woods on the bench during trial. On
June 27, 1874, Justice Bradley and Judge Woods split: Justice Bradley announced his
opinion to overturn the convictions; Justice Woods disagreed, thereby guaranteeing
the appeal to the Supreme Court. ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS,
1866-1876, at 176–81 (1985).
86. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556–57 (1875).
87. Id. at 559.
88. See, e.g., text accompanying note 296 infra.
89. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 549 (“Citizens are the members of the political
community to which they belong . . . . In the formation of a government, the people
may confer upon it such powers as they choose.”).
90. Id. at 550 (“Within the scope of its powers, as enumerated and defined, [the
national government] is supreme and above the States; but beyond, it has no
existence.”).
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and the states serve the People by carefully guarding their reserved
powers.91 For this comprehensive theory of state sovereignty,
Cruikshank cited only two authorities: Slaughterhouse and the
Preamble to the Constitution.92
Dismissals of prosecutions for acts of racial terrorism continued,
as the Court narrowed each of the post-War civil rights enforcement
statutes to protect states’ sovereignty. In United States v. Harris, the
Court unanimously relied on Slaughterhouse as it applied the tenets
of the Cruikshank creed to dismiss indictments under the Klan Act
against members of a Tennessee lynch mob.93 Hodges v. United States
was similar: dismissing a federal indictment brought under the Force
Act against members of an Arkansas lynch mob, the Court returned
to the theme introduced in Blyew, affirmed as law in Slaughterhouse,
set out as creed in Cruikshank, and reaffirmed in Harris, to explain
once again that the Reconstruction Amendments had not significantly
altered the 1787 balance of federal and state power. 94
In United States v. Reese, the Court extended its states’ rights
analysis to limit the applicability of the voting rights provisions of the
Force Act.95 A state official who refused to permit an AfricanAmerican man to vote was held to be immune from federal charges
because it had not been alleged that the refusal was because of his
race.96 Here, as in Slaughterhouse, the Court saw the focus and impact
of the Reconstruction Amendments as protecting African-Americans
against discrimination in civic affairs rather than establishing a broad
charter of civil rights: The Fifteenth Amendment is, the Court
concluded, an antidiscrimination measure that “does not confer the

91. Id. (“The people of the United States resident within any State are subject to
two governments: one State, and the other National; but there need be no conflict
between the two. The powers which one possesses, the other does not. They are
established for different purposes, and have separate jurisdictions. Together they
make one whole, and furnish the people of the United States with a complete
government, ample for the protection of all their rights at home and abroad.”).
92. See id. at 549 (“The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the
United States and a citizen of a State, but his rights of citizenship under one of those
governments will be different from those he has under the other.”) (citing The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 68 U.S. at 74); id. at 549–50 (citing U.S. CONST. pmbl.).
93. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 638-39 (1882).
94. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16 (1906) (“Notwithstanding the
adoption of these three Amendments, the National Government still remains one of
enumerated powers, and the Tenth Amendment, which reads, ‘the powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people,’ is not shorn of its vitality.”).
95. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221–22 (1875).
96. Id. at 218.
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right of suffrage upon any one.”97
Although they were decided favorably for the civil rights plaintiffs
and are cited by some scholars as the high-water mark of the Court’s
Reconstruction jurisprudence Virginia v. Rives,98 Strauder v. West
Virginia,99 Ex parte Virginia,100 and Neal v. Delaware101 also yielded
narrow readings of the Reconstruction Amendments. In each of these
cases, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited the
exclusion of blacks from jury service, not because jury service is an
entitlement of national citizenship, but because the exclusions
constituted racially discriminatory state action that denied black
jurors equal protection of the laws.102
In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court invalidated in its entirety the
last of the post-War civil rights statutes: the Public Accommodations
Act.103 In doing so, the Court rejected the democratic vision that had
inspired proponents of the Act and revived its opponents’ false
dichotomy between political and civil rights on one hand, and “social
rights” on the other. In the course of four years of debate over the
Public Accommodations Act, opponents had lodged two main
arguments against the bill: they argued, consistent with the
Confederate narrative, that it represented an unconstitutional
encroachment of federal authority upon states’ rights,104 and they
argued that the Reconstruction Amendments intended to give newly
freed slaves political and civil, but not social, equality.105 Granting
“social rights” to black people, they argued, would be unacceptable to
the majority of Southern citizens in that it would enforce the sort of
social equality that both races would find repugnant. The next step,
they warned their fellow white congressmen, would be that black
people would “demand a law allowing them, without restraint, to visit

97. Id. at 217.
98. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
99. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
100. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
101. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880).
102. Id. at 397; Rives, 100 U.S. at 320–21; Strauder, 100 U.S. at 312, Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. at 348.
103. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25–26 (1883).
104. See 2 CONG. REC. 388, 405 (1874) (statement of Rep. Durham) (“[Regulation
of schools] are matters purely of local legislation or of private contract.”); CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3190 (1872) (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“[Attending
school] is not any right at all. It is a matter to be regulated by the localities.”); Alfred
H. Kelly, The Congressional Controversy Over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 64 AM.
HIST. REV. 537, 548 (1959).
105. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3189 (1872) (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) (“The right to go to school is not a civil right and never was.”).
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the parlors and drawing-rooms of the whites, and have free and
unrestrained social intercourse with your unmarried sons and
daughters.”106 These arguments reflected what was then a frequently
articulated taxonomy of rights, distinguishing among civil and
political rights, e.g., the rights to buy and sell property; to enter into
contracts; to serve on juries; to appear as witnesses in court; to vote,
and the “social right” to be accommodated in public spaces. This
taxonomy was given the Court’s imprimatur in Plessy v. Ferguson
when the majority explained, “If the civil and political rights of both
races be equal, one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane.”107
However, as historian Rebecca Scott has established, “[t]o conflate
the phrase ‘social equality’ with an imagined taxonomy of civil,
political, and social rights is to mistake an insult for an analytic
exercise.”108 The rights that proponents of the Public Accommodations
Act meant to secure were not so-called social rights but public rights.
In the words of Representative John Lynch, “It is not social rights that
we desire . . . What we ask is protection in the enjoyment of public
rights. Rights which are or should be accorded to every citizen
alike.”109 As Representative Robert Elliot explained, these were “the
right to enjoy the common public conveniences of travel on public
highways, of rest and refreshment at public inns, of education in
public schools, of burial in public cemeteries . . . .”110 In short, the
proponents of the Public Accommodation Acts—some of them former
slaves—articulated a vision of American democratic citizenship that
would take a century for a majority of the Supreme Court to
understand: constitutional citizenship “consists in having a
responsible share according to the capacity in forming and directing
the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating
according to the need in the values which the group sustains.”111
Seeing public accommodation as a “social right,” and seeing no
state involvement in the maintenance of Jim Crow segregation, the
majority in the Civil Rights Cases saw no authority in the federal

106. 2 CONG. REC. 341, app., 343 (1874) (statement of Rep. Read).
107. Plessy v. Ferguson, 153 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
108. Rebecca J. Scott, Public Rights, Social Equality and the Conceptual Roots of
the Plessy Challenge, 106 MICH. L. REV. 777, 781 (2007).
109. 3 CONG. REC. 920, 944 (1875) (statement of Rep. Lynch) (emphasis in
original).
110. 2 CONG. REC. 388, 409 (1874) (statement of Rep. Elliott).
111. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, An Essay in Political Inquiry 147
(1927).
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government to end it.112 The Fourteenth Amendment only addressed
state actions with respect to political and civil rights, and although
the Thirteenth Amendment reached both private and public action,
the Court held that denials of public accommodation had “nothing to
do with slavery or involuntary servitude.”113 The states’ rights theme
of the Cruikshank creed was again sounded: if those denials violated
any right, “redress [was] to be sought under the laws of the
state. . . .”114
C. The Competing Interpretation: A New Charter of Freedom
There is irony in the legacy of the Civil Rights Cases. Although the
Court’s decision has not been overruled, scholars have regularly
questioned its reasoning.115 The durability of the majority opinion has
much to do with the fact that it followed the Cruikshank creed—and
hence the Confederate narrative—in positing and focusing on a
conflict between state and federal power and fixating on that conflict
rather than addressing the more fundamental question whether the
civil rights claimants were entitled, as national citizens, to public
accommodation or to any basic civil right.
By contrast, Justice Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights Cases
squarely faced the fundamental questions concerning the attributes
of national citizenship and concluded that the Reconstruction
Amendments and accompanying federal legislation were “adopted in
the interest of liberty, and for the purpose of securing, through
national legislation rights inhering in the state of freedom and
belonging to American citizenship.”116 Justice Harlan’s dissent begins
and ends with the observation that national rights require national
enforcement.117
Harlan observed with bitter irony that the 1787 Constitution,

112.
113.
114.
115.

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26. (1883).
Id. at 24.
Id.
See Michal R. Belknap, Federalism and the Protection of Civil Rights, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1741, 1744 n. 12 (1986) (reviewing ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-1876 (1985)); Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional
Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353,
1353 (1964); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81
VA. L. REV. 947, 1090 (1995); James M. McGoldrick, The Civil Rights Cases: The
Relevancy of Reversing a Hundred Plus Year Old Error, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 451, 451
(1998).
116. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 27, 61–62 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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together with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, 118 the Fugitive Slave Act
of 1850,119 and the Court’s own decisions in Prigg v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania,120 Ableman v. Booth,121 and Dred Scott v.
Sandford,122 established as much when they gave the federal
government authority to enforce slaveholders’ rights to human
subjugation as a property interest.123 While no clause of the 1787
Constitution explicitly empowered Congress to enforce the master’s
right to his slave, Prigg established that Congress had implicit

118. Congress enacted The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 as a means of implementing
the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. The Act
established the process for both the extradition of fugitives from justice and the
recapture of fugitive slaves. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
119. Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in order to provide slave
owners with a federal mechanism for recapturing fugitive slaves. Act of Sept. 18, 1850,
ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462. The Act of 1793 had largely relied upon state authorities to enforce
slave owners’ rights. The 1850 Act sought to remedy that problem by, among other
things, authorizing federal judges to appoint United States commissioners with the
power “to exercise and discharge all the powers and duties conferred by this
act,” including the power to seize and return fugitive slaves to their owners. Act of
Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, § 1, 9 Stat. 462. Thus, the 1850 Act for the first time empowered
federal law enforcement officials to directly engage in the pursuit, capture, and return
of slaves to their masters.
120. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 661 (1842).
121. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1858). Booth grew out of efforts in
northern states to openly resist enforcement of the Fugitive Slave At of 1850 in the
name of state sovereignty. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s
Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73 FORDHAM
L. REV. 153, 202 (2004). In Booth, a number of Wisconsin state officials and private
citizens “openly defied federal authorities attempting to recapture a slave by the name
of Joshua Glover . . . . Abolitionists who assisted Glover to escape were prosecuted in
the United States District Court for Wisconsin.” Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court,
supra, at 202. One of the arrested defendants, Sherman M. Booth, was tried and
convicted of violating the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1, 4–5 (Wis.
1854). Booth petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus. In
re Booth, 3 Wis. at 4. The Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered his release, holding that
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional. In re Booth, 3 Wis. at 31–32. The
federal government appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Booth, 62 U.S. at
511–12. The Court, in a decision by Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, reversed the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision, and upheld the constitutionality of the Act of
1850. Booth, 62 U.S. at 526.
122. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 416 (1857).
123. According to the court’s own logic, insofar as the master had the right to his
slave, insofar as that right was grounded in the Constitution, and insofar as Congress
had both the authority and obligation to secure that right, Justice Harlan said, quoting
Prigg, that “[i]t would be a strange anomaly and forced construction to suppose that
the national government meant to rely for the due fulfillment of its own proper duties,
and the rights which it intended to secure, upon State legislation, and not upon that
of the Union.” The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 29 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 623 (1842) (emphasis added)).
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authority to do so because “a clause of the Constitution conferring a
right should not be so construed as to make it shadowy, or
unsubstantial, or leave the citizen without a remedial power adequate
for its protection.”124
Under Justice Harlan’s reading, the Reconstruction Amendments
“did something more than to prohibit slavery as an institution . . .
[they] established and decreed universal civil freedom throughout the
United States.”125 In contrast, to the Court’s earlier and shameful
rulings that Congress had power to protect the right to hold human
beings as chattel, he argued that:
[T]he national government has the power, whether expressly
given or not, to secure rights protected by the Constitution.
That doctrine ought not now to be abandoned when the inquiry
is not as to an implied power to protect the master’s rights but
what may Congress, under powers expressly granted, do for the
protection of freedom and the rights necessarily inhering in a
state of freedom.126
Justice Harlan drew a crucial link between the Thirteenth
Amendment’s prohibition of slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment’s
grant of birthright citizenship in Section 1. The Fourteenth
Amendment’s citizenship clause was, Harlan argued, a “supreme act
of the nation” that instantly brought black people “into the political
community known as the ‘People of the United States.’”127 The civil
freedom conferred by the Thirteenth Amendment therefore
encompasses the privileges and immunities of citizenship. As Justice
Harlan put it, the Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress power
“in terms distinct and positive, to enforce ‘the provisions of [Section
1],’ of [the] amendment; not simply those of a prohibitive character,
but the provisions—all of the provisions—affirmative and prohibitive,
of the amendment.”128
According to Harlan, this interplay between the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments meant that Congress had full power to
protect those rights “fundamental in citizenship in a free republican
government.”129 The Reconstruction Amendments and acts designed
to enforce them were meant “to compel a recognition of the legal right
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 28 (quoting Prigg, v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 612 (1842)).
Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 34–35 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 47.
Id. at 46. (emphasis added)
Id. at 47.
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of the black race to take the rank of citizens, and to secure the
enjoyment of privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a
component part of the people for whose welfare and happiness
government is ordained.”130 He ended as he began, with reference to
the Court’s earlier support of slave power:
I insist that the national legislature may, without
transcending the limits of the Constitution, do for human
liberty and the fundamental rights of American citizenship,
what it did, with the sanction of this court, for the protection
of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive slaves. 131
Nearly twenty years later, having endured the succession of cases
holding the federal government impotent to protect against
supremacist terrorism, the Justice made clear, dissenting in Hodges,
the Arkansas lynching case, the full reach of the rights of national
citizenship that the Reconstruction Amendments, taken together,
should secure to all:
[T]he liberty protected by the 14th Amendment against state
action inconsistent with due process of law is neither more nor
less than the freedom established by the 13th Amendment . . .
[S]uch liberty “means not only the right of the citizen to be
free from the mere physical restraint of his person . . . but the
term is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties.”132
II. POWER AND THE PEOPLE: CIVIL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE TESTED BY
A PEOPLE’S MOVEMENT
Civil rights statutes that Justice Harlan thought legitimate under
the post-slavery constitution lay nearly dormant in subsequent years.
Their disuse was not entirely attributable to their critical reading by
the Supreme Court. As the Court shrank from what seemed to have
been clear implications of the Reconstruction Amendments for federal
enforcement of civil rights, many white Americans grew weary and
wary of Reconstruction’s multi-racial vision and increasingly
sympathetic to the former Confederacy’s complaints of occupation,

130. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 51.
132. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 36 (1906) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 579 (1897)) (emphasis in original).
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abuse, and disempowerment. What the Court in Slaughterhouse had
described as a goal of restoring the seceded states to their 1787 powers
became a national priority as compromise was reached with southern
Democrats and federal intervention in southern affairs came to be
seen as untoward.133
Notwithstanding the official and popular retreat from
Reconstruction’s commitment to a fulsome idea of national
citizenship, the vision lived among the People—especially among
those who had endured the status of constitutional property. In every
dimension of personal and public life, African-Americans, women, and
other subordinated groups regularly claimed and enacted what they
understood to be their rights to full and free citizenship.
The wave of sit-in, freedom ride, and voter registration activity
that culminated in the 1960s has been perhaps the most conspicuous
and consequential revival of Reconstruction-era claims of national
citizenship. As civil rights leader Robert Moses reports, sit-in
demonstrators, freedom riders, and voting rights activists enacted a
freedom that they understood to be their birthright. Moses explains
that “We, as People of the United States” claimed with our bodies the
rights to occupy public space as civic equals and to be counted in the
political process. 134 Moses also reports that the Reconstruction-era
civil rights statutes—broken as they were in the interpretive process
described in the preceding section—provided “crawl space” for the
Civil Rights Movement that culminated in the 1960s. 135 When 1957
civil rights legislation created a Civil Rights Division within the
Justice Department, federal enforcement became more focused, and
civil rights workers gained a direct line through which they could call
on federal authorities to provide some relief from repeated and
lengthy jailings (and, in some cases, from spending time in some of
the nation’s worst prisons) and to provide protection, albeit tragically
limited protection, against supremacist violence.136 For authority to
provide that relief and protection, federal officials relied on the
Reconstruction Amendments and on remnants of the post-Civil War
legislation that was to have been the spine of Reconstruction. The

133. See generally HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION:
RACE, LABOR, AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865-1901, at 122–55
(2001).
134. Robert P Moses, Speech at Colgate College 12–17 (January 20, 2011) (on file
with the authors).
135. ROBERT P. MOSES & CHARLES E. COBB, JR., RADICAL EQUATIONS: CIVIL
RIGHTS FROM MISSISSIPPI TO THE ALGEBRA PROJECT, 92 (2001).
136. See Symposium, Voices of the Civil Rights Division, Then and Now, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 269 (2013).
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movement’s “crawl space” was created, then, by cobbling together a
rather feeble piece of mid-twentieth century civil rights legislation
and the residue of congressional Reconstruction: the Justice
Department’s newly created Civil Rights Division summoned powers
created by post-Civil War amendments and statutes in response to the
claims and calls of a People’s movement.137
The 1960s civil rights movement called upon federal power to
vindicate two kinds of claims. In what we term civil rights
“enforcement” cases, the Civil Rights Division attempted to prosecute
opponents of the movement for acts of terrorism against civil rights
advocates. These federal prosecutions were challenged on the ground
that the national government was usurping the states’ police power.
In what we term civil rights “enactment” cases, protesters performed
what they saw as a national right to inhabit public spaces on an
integrated basis and to participate in local and federal political
processes. These enactments were the genius of the 1960s Civil Rights
Movement; they were “demand side” demonstrations of the free
citizenship to which the protesters thought all people were entitled.
In response to their enactments of citizenship, protesters were
arrested, charged, and convicted of state crimes like trespassing or
disturbing the peace. Turning here to the federal courts, rather than
to the Justice Department, protesters challenged these prosecutions
on the ground that people could not be punished for exercising their
national constitutional rights to peacefully inhabit public spaces and
to participate in political processes. Both enforcement claims and
enactment claims were contests between state and federal power,
with states claiming supremacy in the realm of policing human
behavior and the national government claiming supremacy as a
guardian of human rights.
A. Assigning the “Occasional Unpleasant Task” of Civil Rights
Enforcement
To set the 1960s cases in context, we must look to two sets of cases
that predated the Movement’s rise to prominence. After the
significant post-Reconstruction hiatus in federal civil rights
prosecutions,138 the Court faced, in 1945, yet another federal attempt
137. See John Doar, The Work of the Civil Rights Division in Enforcing Voting
Rights under the Voting Rights of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1997).
138. See STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE S.COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS. REP. ON CIVIL RIGHTS 26 (Comm. Print 1977)
(“At first, principal enforcement of the newly created civil rights came—as the
Reconstruction Congresses had expected—from the Federal Government, through
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to punish white supremacist terror. The facts fit a familiar pattern:
Claude Screws, the Sheriff of the somewhat notorious Baker County
in Georgia, acting with a deputy and a local police officer, arrested
Robert Hall, a young black man accused of stealing a tire.139 They
handcuffed Hall, drove him to the local courthouse, beat him nearly
to death, dragged him feet-first across the courthouse lawn to a jail,
threw him on the floor and summoned an ambulance.140 Robert Hall
died within an hour of being transported to a local hospital. 141 Screws
and his collaborators faced no state charges, but were convicted in
federal court, under surviving provisions of the Citizenship Act,142 of
conspiring to violate, and violating, Hall’s civil rights.143
When the Georgia officers appealed, three Justices stood firmly
against federal prosecution of what they understood to be state
crimes. Justice Frankfurter wrote for them, invoking the Confederate
narrative to argue that the officers’ federal prosecution
unconstitutionally disrupted the steady state of Georgia’s sovereignty
with respect to the enforcement of criminal laws. Noting that the
murder of Robert Hall was a state crime, these justices argued that
where “[s]tate law is in conformity with the Constitution and local
misconduct is in undisputed violation of that State law” it was
preferable to “leave to the States the enforcement of their criminal
law,” and not “weaken the habits of local law enforcement by tempting
reliance on federal authority for an occasional unpleasant task of local
enforcement.”144 Justice Douglas, in just the sixth of his thirty-six
years on the bench, wrote for the Court and elided the question of
federal power by reversing on the ground that the jury had not been
instructed to find a willful violation of Hall’s constitutional rights, and
remanding for a new trial under more precise jury instruction.145

criminal prosecutions. Between 1870 and 1894, there were over 7,000 Federal
prosecutions for civil rights violations. As the century drew to a close, the massive
retreat from the earlier mood, accompanied by extraordinarily restrictive (and often
disingenuous) decisions by the Supreme Courts slowed civil rights enforcement to a
trickle. It was not until the 1940s and 1950s that real advances in civil rights
enforcement began again.”).
139. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 92–93 (1945).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The government charged Screws and his collaborators under Section 20 of
the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. 52. That section was first enacted as part of the
Citizenship Act. Id. at 93. The amended, modern equivalent, has substantially the
same language, 18 U.S.C. § 242.
143. Screws, 325 U.S. at 93.
144. Screws, 325 U.S. at 149 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 106–07.
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Dissenting Justices Murphy and Rutledge shined a critical light
on the Court’s failure to directly address the reach of federal power
and the value, in this context, of state supremacy. Justice Murphy
wrote passionately to argue that Federal constitutional power was
sufficient and necessary to protect against “the cruelties of bigoted
and ruthless [state and local] authority.”146 Justice Rutledge
challenged what he saw underlying both the Douglas opinion’s resort
to technicalities and the Frankfurter opinion’s wishful deference to
the State of Georgia: The underlying issue was, he said, the question
of “federal power.”147 Echoing the first Justice Harlan, Rutledge then
argued that in the world created by the Reconstruction Amendments,
“federal power lacks no strength to reach [state officials’] malfeasance
in office when it infringes constitutional rights.” 148
The Screws prosecutions were not so far in time from Civil War
and Reconstruction that they escaped their aftermath. In the 1940s
(and long after), it was still regularly taught—and believed—that
Reconstruction was at best an idealistic mistake and at worst a fit of
vengeful rule by uncomprehending or malicious Carpetbaggers and
incompetent blacks. 149 Justice Frankfurter’s deliberately narrow
reading of the Reconstruction legislation under which Screws and his
collaborators had been charged alluded uncritically to this view of
Reconstruction. “It is familiar history,” he said, “that much of this
legislation was born of that vengeful spirit which to no small degree
envenomed the Reconstruction era. Legislative respect for
constitutional limitations was not at its height and Congress passed
laws clearly unconstitutional.”150
As if in answer to this view of Reconstruction, Justice Rutledge
wrote that if federal power to protect civil rights is a great power, “it
is one generated by the Constitution and the Amendments, to which
the states have assented and their officials owe prime allegiance.”151
At the heart of Justice Rutledge’s cri de coeur, was the conundrum
this article seeks to confront: How can there be a federal right without
a federal remedy? Resolving it will require a deeper understanding
146. Id. at 138 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 133 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Rutledge, J., concurring) For the sake of avoiding a tie, Justice Rutledge
joined the remand judgment. Id. at 134.
149. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION & FAMILY
VALUES 150 (1997); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 120 (Henry S. Commager et al. eds., 1988); ERIC FONER,
FREEDOM'S LAWMAKERS: A DIRECTORY OF BLACK OFFICEHOLDERS DURING
RECONSTRUCTION xii (1993).
150. Screws, 325 U.S. at 140 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 133 (Rutledge, J., concurring).

2017]

THE CONFEDERATE NARRATIVE

329

than the Court has yet undertaken of the values protected by the
separation of state and federal responsibilities.
Sheriff Screws and his codefendants were retried under the
Douglas opinion’s recommended instructions. Each was acquitted,
and each returned to state law enforcement duties.152 Moreover, the
Douglas opinion’s requirements made prosecution of civil rights
violations almost prohibitively difficult.153 Justices Murphy and
Rutledge both died in 1949, but broodings about federal power to
enforce civil rights did not die with them. As we will see, Justice
Douglas soon abandoned the cautious stance he had announced in
Screws and took up the Murphy/Rutledge call for national
enforcement of civil rights.
Ironically, the Court next confronted the question of the
Department’s power to enforce federal constitutional rights in two
1951 cases that made no mention of, and seemingly had nothing to do
with, racial justice. Yet, here again, it proved impossible for the Court
to issue a majority opinion addressing the reach of Federal civil rights
enforcement power. The cases, both captioned United States v.
Williams, and decided on the same day, arose out of an effort by the
Justice Department to prosecute three “deputized” investigators and
a police officer who had, at the request of the owners of a hardware
store in Miami, Florida, beaten and tortured store employees to get
them to confess to stealing lumber.154
We have seen that, beginning with the Force Act, Reconstruction
legislation criminalized both direct interferences with civil rights and
conspiracies to interfere with civil rights. One of the Williams cases
involved a conviction under surviving remnants of the conspiracy
provision (the application of which had been precluded, without
government appeal, during an early phase of the attempted
prosecution of Sheriff Screws) and another involved a conviction
under surviving remnants of the direct or substantive criminal
provision (the provision that was at issue when the Court vacated
Sheriff Screws’ conviction).155 These two cases were rematches in the
battle over federal power that had been fought in Screws and here
Justices Douglas and Frankfurter squared off in sharp disagreement.
The conviction under the substantive provision had been obtained

152. Harry H. Shapiro, Limitations in Prosecuting Civil Rights Violations, 46
CORNELL L. REV. 532, 535 (1961).
153. See Shapiro, supra note 158, at 551. See also BRANCH, supra note 149, at 409.
154. United States v. Williams (Williams I), 341 U.S. 70, 71 (1951).
155. Id. at 71–72; Williams v. United States (Williams II), 341 U.S. 97, 99 (1951);
see also Brief for the Petitioners at 2, Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (No.
42).

330

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.301

under a charging script tailored in its description of willfulness to
meet the vagueness concerns of which Douglas had written in
Screws.156 Douglas wrote for the majority, retreating somewhat from
the charging requirements he had set in Screws. Noting that the
Screws charging requirements were necessary in cases in which the
intent to deprive someone of constitutional rights was unclear,
Douglas hinted at their possible superfluousness in this classic case
of coerced confession: the intent to deny the victims’ constitutional
rights was, he wrote, “plain as a pikestaff.” 157 Justice Frankfurter
wrote briefly for three other Justices, to say that they dissented for
the reasons set forth in Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion in Screws
and to make the (unexplained) comment that they were strengthened
in their views by “[e]xperience in the effort to apply the doctrine of
Screws.”158
In the conspiracy case, Frankfurter wrote for the same three
Justices who had dissented in the substantive case and for Chief
Justice Vinson. The opinion’s conclusions were consistent with
Frankfurter’s earlier positions, but difficult to reconcile with the
outcome in the substantive case. Despite strong similarities in the
wording and professed purposes of the substantive and conspiracy
provisions, Justice Frankfurter argued that the conspiracy provision
was less broad. It was less broad, he said, not because of its language
or purpose, but because of a want of constitutional authority. In words
that call to mind the reasoning of Slaughterhouse,159 Frankfurter
wrote that the conspiracy provision did not address conspiracies to
deny the full panoply of federal civil rights, but only conspiracies to
deny rights “arising from the substantive powers of the Federal
Government.”160 The gravamen of Frankfurter’s critique was that the
conspiracy provision only covered conduct that the Federal
government had power, independently of the Fourteenth Amendment,
to enforce against individuals,161 and the federal government had no
power to forbid individuals to violate other individuals’ civil rights.162
Conspiring to commit the act was safe against Federal sanction, they
argued, even though the Court had held that the action itself was

156. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 106–107.
157. Williams II, 341 U.S. at 101.
158. Williams II, 341 U.S. at 104 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)..
159. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
160. Williams I, 341 U.S. at 73.
161. Id. at 77 (“[T]he rights which [the conspiracy statute] protects are those
which Congress can beyond doubt constitutionally secure against interference by
private individuals.”).
162. Id. at 81–82.
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subject to Federal sanction. 163
In defense of his narrow and contradictory reading of the
conspiracy
provision,
Frankfurter
relied
pivotally
on
164
Cruikshank. He also revived his critique of Reconstruction
legislation, asserting that “[t]he dominant conditions of the
Reconstruction Period were not conducive to the enactment of
carefully considered and coherent legislation” and that “[s]trong postwar feeling caused inadequate deliberation and led to loose and
careless phrasing of laws relating to the new political issues.” 165 The
count was dead even, with the reach and effectiveness of the
Reconstruction conspiracy provision—and the fates of the defendants’
conspiracy convictions—undetermined. Justice Black broke the tie—
and saved the defendants from their conspiracy convictions—by
ruling that the convictions were invalid on more technical grounds.166
The constitutional reach of both the conspiracy provision and the
substantive provision remained uncertain: Four justices would
apparently limit the conspiracy provision to cover interferences with
what the Court in Slaughterhouse had carved out as uniquely federal
rights; four would apply it to protect against interference with any
rights guaranteed by the federal constitution. Before the Court faced
this nest of issues again it had been sobered, but perhaps even more
confounded, by cases that presented a flip side of federal prosecutions
for Jim Crow violence: state prosecutions for civil rights
demonstrations in which protesters “enacted” rights that they
believed were federally protected, and their enactments were
punished as state crimes.
B. Protecting the Enactment of Free Citizenship
As we saw in our consideration of federal prosecutions against
supremacist violence, there has been intense disagreement about
whether and how federal civil rights enforcement power is limited by
the fact that Fourteenth Amendment proscriptions are in the form “no
State shall” (just as Bill of Rights proscriptions are in the form
“Congress shall make no law”). Some take this language to mean that
the federal government is helpless to punish denials of civil rights
unless those denials represent or are “colored” by “state action.”
Others, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment’s language also

163.
164.
165.
166.

See id. at 82.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 74–75.
Id. at 85–86 (Black, J., concurring).
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confers citizenship, argue that Congress has power to do all that is
necessary and proper to secure the privileges of citizenship. The
question whether a private establishment that is in other respects
open to the public may exclude people on the basis of race elicits an
analogous pair of responses—some arguing that anti-discrimination
is an obligation that only governments owe to the People, and others
arguing that every citizen has a right to be accommodated in public
spaces. Using their passively resistant bodies to integrate
establishments that were open to the public but marked “For Whites
Only,” civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s placed their black and
white bodies in spaces designated “for colored only,” to present an
enforcement conundrum: Could they be ejected by state police and
prosecuted for trespass or ejected by private force? Were they entitled to
federal protection, or were they in a state of nature?
When Movement demonstrators provoked local hostility by
defying and speaking against Jim Crow laws, they were arrested and
prosecuted for trespassing, disturbing the peace, unlawful assembly
and the like. They sought relief in Federal courts, claiming that the
State prosecutions violated their federal right to public
accommodation. In Screws and in the Williams cases, federal civil
rights laws enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment were to have been
a sword against local, anti-civil rights harassment and intimidation.
In these cases, the Amendment itself was used as a shield against
local prosecution of civil rights activists. Forthright determination of
the activists’ claims would have forced the Court to confront, in
another guise, the question of federal power that it had dodged in
Screws and Williams. Although civil rights lawyers raised the power
issue, most of the justices chose to skirt it. Justice Douglas was the
consistent exception.
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court considered 31 cases
involving sit-ins and other kinds of civil rights protest.167 In the first

167. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118
(1966); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741
(1965); Walker v. Georgia, 381 U.S. 355 (1965); Parrot v. City of Tallahassee, 381 U.S.
129 (1965); McKinnie v. Tennessee, 380 U.S. 449 (1965); Blow v. North Carolina, 379
U.S. 684 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379
U.S. 306 (1964); Drews v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 547 (1964); Dresner v. City of
Tallahassee, 378 U.S. 539 (1964); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964); Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964); Henry v.
City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Diamond v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 201 (1964);
Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963); Randolph v. Virginia, 374 U.S. 97 (1963);
Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S.
374 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267 (1963); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Peterson v. City
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of them, a 1960 case involving black demonstrators who had been
convicted in 1951168 of trespassing on a segregated public golf course,
there was agreement that access to the course could not
constitutionally be denied on account of race, but a bare majority, over
strong objection, deemed itself unable on technical grounds to vacate
the convictions or remand the case for further consideration in the
state courts. 169 This was, however, the last time the Supreme Court
would affirm a criminal conviction for a civil rights protest in the midtwentieth century.
Seasoned criminal appellate lawyers will tell you that there is no
such thing as a perfect criminal trial record. As demonstration cases
flooded the Court, this axiom was repeatedly demonstrated as
Justices searched for ways to exonerate members of an increasingly
popular, nonviolent human rights movement without reaching the
fundamental questions of constitutional authority that civil rights
lawyers—and Justice Douglas—repeatedly pressed.
The second case involved a Trailways bus passenger convicted of
trespass for seeking service in a part of the bus terminal designated
for whites only.170 Thurgood Marshall argued for the demonstrators
as director of the premier civil rights litigation unit that was to
become the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund.171 This is
especially significant, for Marshall would later rejoin the Court’s
discourse on federal power as Solicitor General arguing similar issues

of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963); Edwards
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 154 (1962);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 (1960).
168. Notice that the “crime” occurred before, but the ultimate appeal was decided
after, Brown v. Board of Education and cases decided in its wake, which outlawed race
segregation of public facilities.
169. Wolfe, 364 U.S. at 180, 194–96 (1960). A federal court had held that the
course unlawfully discriminated against black people, but a jury had found that the
protesters were not excluded because of their race. Wolfe, 364 U.S. at 180–81. There
was a dispute as to whether the record of the federal case was offered in evidence in
the state criminal proceedings. Wolfe, 364 U.S. at 183. The majority found no
constitutional error in the state supreme court’s affirmance of the conviction. Wolfe,
364 U.S. at 194–96.
170. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 455 (1960).
171. Id. at 454; see Julius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall’s Legacy, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1249, 1252 (1992) (“The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund was
created in 1939 and incorporated in 1940, largely by Thurgood, as a separate
organization from the NAACP. . . . As head of LDF, Thurgood was responsible for
coordinating the entire legal program and the specific litigation strategies of LDF and
the NAACP.”).

334

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.301

for the United States (and still later, of course, as a Justice). 172
Marshall and his colleagues sought a constitutional ruling that the
denial of service violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 173 A
comfortable majority of the Court chose not to reach the constitutional
question, but took the unusual step of reversing the conviction on a
ground not raised by the protesters.174 Pioneering a practice of
resorting to Federal Commerce Clause powers rather than grappling
with the meaning of constitutional personhood, seven Justices held
the conviction invalid because the denial of service was in the course
of interstate travel and therefore violated anti-discrimination
provisions of the Federal Interstate Commerce Act. 175
Garner v. Louisiana, a sit-in case involving a sit-in demonstration
that resulted in convictions for disturbing the peace, was the first of
the 1960s protest cases in which the justices disagreed publically
about core civil rights and federalism principles. 176 The
demonstrators, once again represented by Thurgood Marshall’s civil
rights litigation unit, 177 had sought to enact, to call attention to, and
to establish as a matter of constitutional law, their right to be
accommodated in public spaces. 178 This time, every justice voted in
favor of the protesters. A majority (including Justice Frankfurter179)
avoided the constitutional issues by voting to vacate the
demonstrators’ convictions on the ground that there was no evidence
that the peace of the Louisiana community in which the sit-in
occurred was disturbed or was likely to be disturbed. 180
Justices Douglas thought any fool could see, and any judge might
rightfully take judicial notice, that public, integrated dining would
disturb the peace of downtown Baton Rouge, Louisiana in the 1960s,
and he squarely confronted the question the demonstrators had
172. For an overview of Marshall’s civil rights advocacy before the court as
solicitor general see Russell Moss, Marshall’s Battles Before the Bench, 1 HOW. SCROLL
SOC. JUST. REV. 148, 158-61 (1993).
173. Boynton, 364 U.S. at 457.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 463–64.
176. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
177. The case was argued by Jack Greenberg, with William Coleman, James
Nabritt, III, and Louis Pollak on the brief. All were counsel at and for the Legal
Defense Fund. See Brief for Petitioners at 38, Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961)
(No. 26).
178. See Garner, 368 U.S. at 160–63.
179. Id. at 174. Justice Frankfurter concurred separately to emphasize that “the
whole question on the answer to which the validity of these convictions turns” was
whether “the ‘public’ tended to be alarmed by the conduct of the petitioners” and that
no attempt had been made to prove it. Garner, 368 U.S. at 175.
180. Id. at 163–64.
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wanted to pose. In bold and controversial181 terms, Douglas laid out
an inclusive definition of the public sphere. He relied on language
from the Civil Rights Cases182 to argue that State action included not
only the enforcement of State laws but also the enforcement of local
customs. Pointing to a long and wide-ranging183 list of Louisiana laws
requiring race segregation, he concluded that segregation was so
much a part of the policies and customs of the State of Louisiana that
the state was complicit even when it enforced a policy of segregation
that happened not to be officially mandated.184 Looking to tort and
administrative law precedents, Douglas found ample authority for
inhibiting a proprietor’s choices about how to run a business. Drawing
a connection to New Deal legislation that permissibly regulated
“private” businesses in order to promote social welfare, he argued that
a state’s regulation of establishments serving the public made the
state complicit when it permitted and enforced a regulated business
establishment’s voluntary segregation policies.185
In language that seemed responsive to the Movement’s claim to be
the voice of the People, Douglas sounded a People’s narrative. After
pointing out that “[t]he authority to license a business for public use
is derived from the public” he reminded his readers that “Negroes are
as much a part of that public as are whites.” 186 Having oriented his
account to protection of people’s rights as a steady state, Douglas
renewed Harlan challenge that the Court take on the work of
understanding what a post-slavery, classless society would look like

181. See Kenneth L. Karst & William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, Sit-Ins and State
Action—Mr. Justice Douglas, Concurring, 14 STAN. L. REV. 762, 765–68 (1962)
(explaining that Justice Douglas believed “custom, observed by parallel private
decisions and uncoerced by state police or state laws,” was sufficient to qualify as State
action).
182. Garner, 368 U.S. at 178 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[C]ivil rights, such as are
guaranteed by the constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the
wrongful acts of individual, unsupported by state authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.” (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 17 (1883))) (emphasis in original).
183. Common carriers of passengers had to provide separate waiting rooms and
reception room facilities for the two races. LA. REV. STAT. §45:1303 (West 1960)
(repealed 1972); Louisiana required that all circuses or tent exhibitions to which the
public was invited must have separate entrances for separate races. LA. REV. STAT. §
4:5 (West 1950) (repealed 1975); No dancing, social functions, entertainment, athletic
training, games, sports, contests “and other such activities involving personal and
social contacts” were open to both races. LA. REV. STAT. § 4:451 (West 1960) (repealed
1972).
184. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961).
185. Id. at 184–85.
186. Id. at 184.
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and debating whether—or to what extent—the United States was
constitutionally committed to being such a society. 187 And with this,
he opened a Pandora’s Box of new questions about federal power: This
time the question was not whether the federal government could
prosecute individuals, rather than states, for civil rights violations,
but whether private persons could discriminate on racial grounds in
their privately owned businesses and count on the state to enforce
their exclusionary commands.
As protesters were repeatedly arrested and convicted,
demonstration cases proliferated in the Supreme Court. On a single
day in 1963, the Court decided six of them.188 Justice Frankfurter had
resigned and been replaced by Arthur Goldberg, who promptly joined
Justice Douglas’s broodings about state action and people’s rights.189
The six civil rights cases decided on May 20, 1963 were all decided in
favor of the demonstrators; all convictions were vacated. Eight
justices voted in every one either to vacate or to remand for further
proceedings.190 Peterson, chosen as the lead case, was briefed and
argued for the demonstrators by NAACP Legal Defense Fund
attorneys191 who led with a claim that public accommodation is a
federally protected right, even when the decision to segregate is made
by the accommodation’s private proprietors.192 Once again, the Court

187. Id. at 185 (“As the first Mr. Justice Harlan stated in dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, . . . in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country
no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution
is color-blind.”).
188. See generally Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373
U.S. 267 (1963); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham,
373 U.S. 374 (1963); Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
189. David M. Levitan, The Effect of the Appointment of a Supreme Court Justice,
28 U. TOL. L. REV. 37, 60–63 (1996) (discussing the impact of Justice Frankfurter’s
resignation on civil rights cases).
190. Peterson, 373 U.S. 244 (unanimous decision) (Warren, C.J., opinion) rev’g 122
S.E.2d 826 (S.C. 1961); Shuttlesworth, 373 U.S. 262 (7–1 decision) (Warren, C.J.,
majority opinion), rev’g 134 So. 2d 215 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961), and 134 So. 2d 213 (Ala.
Ct. App. 1961); Lombard, 373 U.S. 267 (7–1 decision) (Warren, C.J., majority opinion),
rev’g 132 So. 2d 860 (La. 1961); Wright, 373 U.S. 284 (unanimous decision) (Warren,
C.J., opinion), rev’g 122 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. 1961); Gober, 373 U.S. 374 (per curiam), vac’g
133 So. 2d 697 (Ala. Ct. App. 1961); Avent, 373 U.S. 375 (per curiam), vac’g 118 S.E.2d
47 (N.C. 1961).
191. Matthew J. Perry, then Chief Counsel for the South Carolina Conference of
the NAACP, served as counsel for the demonstrators in Peterson. See
http://www.columbiabusinessmonthly.com/ViewArticle/ArticleID/1224/Remembering-Judge-Matthew-J-Perry.aspx
192. See Peterson, 373 U.S. at 247 (noting that the petitoners’ argument was based
on the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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ruled in favor of the individual defendants, but failed to address the
People’s claim of right.193 No defense of the People’s narrative was
voiced. To the contrary, Justice Harlan II, took up Justice
Frankfurter’s baton, not to the full symphony of restricting the reach
of the Fourteenth Amendment to what Slaughterhouse set off as
uniquely federal rights, but to the tune of insisting that federal
enforcement of civil rights had to be limited to proceedings against the
states. 194 In doing so, he sounded the Confederate narrative:
“[I]nherent in the concept of state action are values of federalism, a
recognition that there are areas of private rights upon which federal
power should not lay a heavy hand and which should properly be left
to the more precise instruments of local authority.”195
Five months after the Court announced its decisions in Peterson,
et al., it heard arguments in two other sit-in cases. Eight months later,
it brought these two cases to a conclusion, ducking once again the
question whether there is a constitutional right of public
accommodation and remanding each case to state courts for
reconsideration in light of anti-discrimination laws passed after the
sit-ins had occurred.196 Justice Douglas seemed infuriated by the
Court’s failure to reach the constitutional question presented by the
cases, and he had gained allies: Chief Justice Earl Warren (who, like
Douglas, had voted in the past to duck the constitutional question)
and Justice Goldberg (who had replaced Justice Frankfurter) adopted
Douglas’s view on the right to public accommodation.197 In words that
gave a sense of the tenor of the time, Douglas asserted that “[t]he
whole nation has to face the issue” of public accommodation:
Congress is conscientiously considering it [in deliberations
193. See, e.g., Lombard, 373 U.S. at 271–74 (reversing based on the presence of
State action, not an individual right to public accommodation).
194. Justice John Marshal Harlan II would have remanded all but one of the cases
for closer inquiry into the role played by local authority and whether the various
proprietors acted under official compulsion. Peterson, 373 U.S. at 250–61 (Harlan II,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. Id. at 250. The majority assumed a State action requirement and found that
it was, or could have been, met by local segregation ordinances or, in one case, by a
sheriff’s announcement. See Peterson, 373 U.S. at 246–48 (relying on an ordinance to
satisfy the State action requirement); Shuttlesworth, 373 U.S. at 264–65 (relying on a
trespass ordinance to satisfy State action requirement); Lombard, 373 U.S. at 273–74
(equating a sheriff and other city official’s pro-segregation statements to State action).
196. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 239–42 (1964).
197. See id. at 286 (Goldberg, J., concurring with Warren, C.J., joining) (“I am
impelled to state the reasons for my conviction that the Constitution guarantees to all
Americans the right to be treated as equal members of the community with respect to
public accommodations.”).
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over what was to be enacted, eleven days later, as the Civil
Rights Act of 1964]; some municipalities have had to make it
their first order of concern; law enforcement officials are
deeply implicated, North as well as South; the question is at
the root of demonstrations, unrest, riots, and violence in
various areas. The issue in other words consumes the public
attention. Yet we stand mute. . . .198
Douglas then made his position on the core constitutional question
crystal clear, and in doing so made the strongest assertion he had
made yet with respect to federal power to protect civil rights. Once
again echoing the People’s claim of national right, he grounded his
position by saying: “We deal here with incidents of national
citizenship.”199 Reviewing the arguments he had made in Garner, he
concluded that whether the American version of apartheid was
mandated, enforced, or simply tolerated by the state, it violated the
People’s rights that were solidified by the Reconstruction
Amendments.
C. Confronting A Sharper Cry for Civil Rights Enforcement
Months after the decision in Bell, Robert Moses and his colleagues
were struggling to discover ways to call the nation’s attention to
Southern terrorism. When asked about Freedom Summer 1964,
Robert Moses often says that three supremacist murders and the
failures of Mississippi and Federal officials to bring the murderers to
justice persuaded young people in the Movement that it was necessary
and right to call a group of college students to Mississippi and force
the country to “look at itself.” Violence against black civil rights
workers in Mississippi was routine and officially tolerated. 200 Drastic

198. Id. at 243 (Douglas, J., concurring).
199. Id. at 249.
200. Moses knew this from personal experience. After he was beaten by a sheriff’s
nephew, a local jury acquitted the sheriff’s nephew. Steven F. Lawson, Prelude to the
Voting Rights Act: The Suffrage Crusade, 1962-1965, 57 S. C. L. REV. 889, 894 (2006).
Things got worse. Voter registration activist Herbert Lee was shot dead by Eugene
Hurst, a member of the Mississippi legislature. W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham,
the Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1075,
1097 n.57 (1996). Hurst said that Lee had a tire iron. Local officials pressured Lewis
Allen, a black man who had witnessed the killing, to testify before a local grand jury
that Lee did have a tire iron. John Doar, Essay, The Work of the Civil Rights Division
in Enforcing Voting Rights Under the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, 25 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1997). Federal Justice Department officials said they could do nothing.
Two years later, on New Year’s Eve, 1964, Louis Allen, who had admitted to federal
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measures were needed if the Movement was not to be snuffed out by
terror.
The drastic measure chosen was Freedom Summer 1964.
Hundreds of young people from across the country joined a
demonstration of multi-racial citizenship to claim, as People of the
United States, the rights of public accommodation and political
participation. They trained in the Spring of 1964 to become nonviolent protesters, voter registration coaches and teachers in
“Freedom Schools” and then traveled to Mississippi to live and work
during the summer in sharecropper communities in enactments of
multi-racial democracy.
As Moses had predicted, Freedom Summer became a public
spectacle, and what the country saw when it “looked at itself” were
the terrorist murders of yet another young black civil rights worker
and—alas, more compellingly to the nation as a whole—two white
college students who were volunteers in the Freedom Summer project.
The terrorist murders of James Cheney, Robert Goodman, and
Michael Schwerner were barely addressed at the time in the
Mississippi Court system.201 Justice Department attempts to
prosecute fifteen alleged lynch mob members, three of them law

officials that he saw no tire iron, was also murdered. Hodes, supra, at 1097 n. 57. There
was no state or federal prosecution. There followed the assassination of Medgar Evers,
one of Mississippi’s most prominent civil rights leaders, by a member of the White
Citizens’ Council. There was no state or federal prosecution. The Civil Rights Legacy
of
Medgar
Evers,
NPR:
NEWS
&
NOTES
(June
13,
2015),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story /story.php?storyId=4700724.
201. The political and law enforcement climate in Neshoba County, the county in
which the civil rights workers were murdered, is suggested by this account of a 1966
demonstration that Martin Luther King, Jr. led at the county courthouse on the second
anniversary of the murders:
A large man dressed in a cowboy hat, sunglasses and a short-sleeved uniform
met King at the two-story red-brick courthouse. It was Deputy Cecil Price.
Price said, “You can't come up these steps.” “Oh, yes,” King replied. “You’re
the one who had Schwerner and the other fellows in jail.” “Yes, sir,” Price
answered. King tried to address the crowd above the loud jeers of white
onlookers. “In this county, Andrew Goodman, James Chaney, and Michael
Schwerner were brutally murdered. I believe the murderers are somewhere
around me at this moment.” “You’re damn right—they're right behind you,”
muttered the Deputy.
Douglas O. Linder, Bending Toward Justice: John Doar and the “Mississippi Burning”
Trial, 72 MISS. L.J. 731, 754–55 (2002). One of the killers was convicted of murder in
a Mississippi court, but not until 2005. Former Klansman Found Guilty of
Manslaughter, CNN (Jun. 22, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/21/
mississippi.killings/. The remaining suspects in the murders have never been charged.
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enforcement officers, came to the Supreme Court on interim appeal in
1966 in United States v. Price.202 The murders of Goodman, Cheney
and Schwerner were still matters of public consciousness; indeed, the
Government’s oral argument, made by Thurgood Marshall, then
serving as Solicitor General, began by pointing out that the case was
known throughout the world.203
As it had in the Williams cases and in the cases that clustered
around Garner and Peterson, the Court debated a burning
constitutional question in more than one instantiation. United States
v. Price was argued and decided with United States v. Guest. As it had
done with respect to the issue of public accommodation in Garner and
Peterson, the Court found ways to duck the crucial question that the
cases raised.
While Price dealt with Mississippi supremacist terrorism, Guest
dealt with supremacist terrorism in Georgia. Three African-American
army reserve officers were fired on by Klansmen in 1964 as they were
driving on a Georgia highway from a summer assignment at Fort
Benning.204 One of the officers, Lemuel Penn, a 48-year-old decorated
World War II veteran and assistant school superintendent in the
District of Columbia, was shot dead. 205 Predictably, no state
conviction ensued; two of the assailants were charged but acquitted.
Although no officer or employee of the State was involved in the
shooting, the Justice Department charged the Klansmen under
reenacted portions of the Force Act.206 All of the indictments were
dismissed in their entirety by a District Court judge who relied in part
on Williams II to hold that the conspiracy provision did not reach
private actions to deny Fourteenth Amendment rights. 207
Thurgood Marshall had chosen these Georgia and Mississippi
terrorism cases to be his first arguments as Solicitor General. They
were heard on the same day. Having urged, without success, as a civil
rights lawyer that access to privately owned public accommodations
is an entitlement of United States citizenship, Marshall argued in
Guest that private conspiracies to keep people from enjoying access to
202. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966).
203. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966),
(Nos. 59 & 60).
204. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 747 n.1 (1966) (listing the criminal
charges against the defendants).
205. See United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, 487 (M.D. Ga. 1964), rev’d 383
U.S. 745 (1965) (“[T]wo of the defendants, Sims and Myers, have already been
prosecuted . . . for the murder of Lemuel A. Penn and by a jury found not guilty.”).
206. Guest, 383 U.S. at 746–47.
207. Guest, 246 F. Supp. at 478–86. The District Court also held that, if the Klan
Act remnant did reach private action, it was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 486–87.
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public accommodations are prosecutable by the United States, at least
insofar as the facilities are provided by a state. This strategic
concession was possible because the Government had charged the
Guest defendants with conspiring and acting for the purpose of
denying people of African descent equal use of roads, highways and
other public facilities. The Court did not take the bait; Marshall’s
attempt to extend the government’s authority at least to private
action that interfered with the enjoyment of public benefits or
facilities failed. 208 As in the enactment cases, the Court found itself in
these enforcement cases unable to make a majority statement that
significantly broadened the scope of federal power to protect civil
rights.209
Since our method is to focus on competing strands of judicial
brooding rather than on case outcome alone, we need not end the story
of the 1960s cases with a report of failure to put a significant dent in
the state action doctrine. Thurgood Marshall planted, and Justice
Fortas hid away in the Price majority opinion, a time bomb of
historical material that squarely challenges the Confederate
narrative and its underlying premises. This material may one day
permit a more people-focused approach to the question of federal civil
rights enforcement power.
But for the very public drama of the Mississippi murders, the
Court’s opinion in Price might be regarded as unremarkable. Eighteen
people, three of them law enforcement officers, had been charged with
violating and conspiring to violate the provisions of Sections 241 and
242 of Title 18 of the United States Code. 210 The district court had
sustained all of the indictments under the general conspiracy statute,
but it had relied on Williams I to dismiss the indictments under the
substantive provisions as to the fifteen defendants who were not State
officials. 211 The allegations were that the abductions and murders of
the civil rights workers were coordinated from start to finish in
collaboration with the law enforcement officers and with their active
participation and that the officers had acted in their official
capacities. 212 Indeed, the extent of official participation was at least
as great, if not greater, than it had been in the Williams cases. But
the private defendants relied on Justice Frankfurter’s four-person

208. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 806 (1966) (noting that the Court’s
decision was based on the traditional state action requirement and did not raise
“fundamental questions of federal-state relationships”).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 790.
211. Id. at 791–93.
212. Id. at 790.

342

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.301

concurrence in Williams I, and on Justice Harlan’s echo of that
concurrence in Peterson, to argue that the conspiracy statute could not
reach them. They argued, that is, that Section 241, the conspiracy
statute, had limitations analogous to those that the Court in
Slaughterhouse held the Fourteenth Amendment itself to have: It
applied to private individuals’ conspiracies only when the
conspirators’ intent was to deprive someone of a uniquely federal
right. Speaking in the terms of the Confederate narrative, with steady
state control at risk of disruption by federal meddling, they argued
that the statute did not apply in ways that would usurp or discourage
state civil rights and criminal justice enforcement.
The Price Court seemed reasonably unified on the surface. Justice
Fortas wrote for the Court, and there was only one brief concurrence
(by Justice Black to distance himself from the Court’s reliance on
Williams II).213 In its second paragraph, the Court denied that it was
making constitutional law. The issue, it said, was simply one of
statutory construction.214 Still, in its next sentence it declared
(ambiguously, we think) that it had no doubt of Congressional power
to enforce by criminal sanction “every right guaranteed by the Due
Process clause.”215 Reasoning that private persons who engage with
state officials in prohibited conduct are acting “under color” of law for
purposes of the conspiracy statute, the opinion easily concluded that
the indictments should not have failed as against the fifteen private
citizens by virtue of their status. 216 In addressing the Williams I
“uniquely federal right” limitation of the conspiracy statute, the Court
relied on legislative history to hold—as a matter of statutory
interpretation rather than as a matter of federal power—that
Congress had intended to reach exactly the kind of private, Klan
terrorism in which the defendants allegedly engaged.217 Frankfurter’s
Slaughterhouse strategy of draining the federal government of power
to address basic civil rights was put to sleep, if not to final rest.
The Court’s reluctance to face questions of federal power is equally
clear in the arguments and opinions in United States v. Guest. Guest,
like, other anti-terrorism cases we have reviewed, was resolved on the
basis of technicalities. The Guest and Price cases differed in that none
of the Guest respondents was a public official. Marshall attempted to
finesse this difficulty by creating a passive link to the state: he argued
213. Id. at 807 (Black, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 789 (majority opinion) (“It is an issue of construction, not of
constitutional power.”).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 799–800.
217. Id. at 801–806.
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that the defendants were interfering with the victims’ access to roads,
highways, and other public facilities that the state was required under
the Fourteenth Amendment to make available regardless of race.
Their actions therefore interfered with the state’s Fourteenth
Amendment obligation of equal protection even though the state was,
as Marshall put it in oral argument, doing its constitutional duty.218
The Court declined to expand state action doctrine in this way; it
instead found a claim of state action in the allegation of a plot to have
African-Americans falsely charged with crimes and suggested that
proof at trial might establish that law enforcement officials were
knowingly involved in the false arrest scheme. 219 The law regarding
the necessity of state action was left untouched.220
Taken as a whole, the three opinions filed in Guest are a tangle of
disagreement. Only Justice Clark joined Justice Stewart’s opinion in
full, and the Justices were unable to agree as to what the opinion
actually held. Justice Harlan joined the Stewart opinion, but
dissented “to the extent that” the conspiracy statute was being held
to cover “conspiracies embracing only the actions of private
persons.”221 Justice Clark wrote separately to deny that the statute
was being held to cover conspiracies embracing only the actions of
private persons, a question he said the opinion “clearly” avoided.222 In
this, he was joined by Justices Black and Fortas. Justice Brennan
interpreted the Stewart opinion to rule against Marshall’s passive
link argument and wrote emphatically to say that he could “find no
principle of federalism nor word of the Constitution” that denies
Congress power to guarantee civil rights. 223 Justice Harlan (II) wrote
at length to disassociate himself from any part of the Court’s opinion
that relied on the existence of a federal right against private

218. Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)
(“Here we have the state opening up and the state has certain responsibilities, but
once the state owns it up nobody should be allowed to prevent the Negro from getting
his right. . . . If the state says ‘Well, we'll go ahead and do what we’re supposed to do
and break it down,’ and hoodlums do the things charged in this indictment then what
happens, the rights are [a] nullity.”).
219. Guest, 383 U.S at 756–57.
220. Presumably the Justices were not persuaded that state action could be found
in the attempt to use state officials unwittingly in the scheme, and a distinction was
made between arrest at the behest of a segregationist shop-owner and arrest at the
behest of a Klan member bent on harassing blacks to deter their exercise of more
clearly established federal rights. See id. at 756 (noting that Klan harassment “may
go considerably further” than arrest at the request of a segregationist shop-owner).
221. Id. at 762–63 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
222. Id. at 762 (Clark, J. dissenting).
223. Id. at 784 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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interference with interstate travel.224
Careful vote-counting and opinion-comparisons tell us, then, that
the scope of federal power to define and enforce a federal body of civil
rights remained unclear after the sit-in and anti-terrorism cases of
the 1960s. The state action doctrine continued—and continues
today—to haunt us; the Price opinion repeated, and the Court has
often repeated, Justice Douglas’s concession in Williams II that “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment protects the individual against state action,
not against wrongs done by individuals,”225 and the Justices in Price
were unable to make a unified statement about the reach of federal civil
rights enforcement power. We remain in doubt about Congressional
authority to contain separatist insult or supremacist terror. But, as
we have suggested, the Price opinion contains material that should
feed further judicial brooding about civil rights and federal power.
Between the lines of Justice Fortas’s rather inconclusive Price
opinion lie historical insights and doctrinal themes that problematize the
Confederate narrative of states’ rights. The Justice orients his readers to
Reconstruction rather than to 1787, framing the conspiracy and
substantive civil rights statutes as having “come to us from
Reconstruction days, the period in our history which also produced the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.”226 Citing Justice Holmes in a voting rights case for the
proposition that the section applies to “all Federal rights,” Fortas calls
to mind the context of Southern terrorism:
The source of this section in the doings of the Ku Klux and the
like is obvious and acts of violence obviously were in the mind
of Congress. Naturally Congress put forth all its powers. . . .
[T]his section dealt with Federal rights and with all Federal
rights, and protected them in the lump . . . . [It should not be
construed so] as to deprive citizens of the United States of the
general protection which on its face § 19 [now § 241] most
reasonably affords.227
Having turned readers’ attention in this case of Klan violence to the
Klan terrorism of the Reconstruction era, Fortas offered a brief history
of southern violence in the years before the conspiracy statute was

224. Id. at 762–74 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
225. United States v. Williams (Williams II), 341 U.S. 70, 92 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
226. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789 (1966).
227. Id. at 800–01 (citing United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 387-88 (1915)).
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passed. This history frames presentation of “the only statement
explanatory of § 241 in the recorded congressional proceedings relative
to its enactment.”228
The statement, which had, ironically, been relied on by Justice
Frankfurter to very different ends in Williams I,229 was cited in the
government’s brief, appended in full to the brief and addressed
repeatedly in Marshall’s oral argument. It made clear that Senator Pool
of North Carolina, sponsor of the conspiracy statute, intended that it
extend beyond protection of uniquely Federal rights. But it did much
more: It repeatedly made clear Pool’s intention that the statute would
protect against the private violence of Klansmen and their ilk, and
Justice Brennan, writing separately in Guest, relied upon it to establish
just that point.230
Senator Pool and his speech merit more attention than they have
received. The lack of attention is interesting in itself. Although the
meaning and reach of the conspiracy statute have been actively
litigated,231 and although a majority of the Court accepted Marshall’s
description of the speech as the “only” thing in the Congressional
Record that spoke directly to the conspiracy provision’s meaning, and
despite Justice Fortas’s decision to append the entire speech to the
Price opinion, the speech has been referenced in only seven subsequent
federal cases, only four of them opinions at the Supreme Court level.232

228. Id. at 805.
229. See United States v. Williams (Williams I), 341 U.S. 70, 74 (1951)(relying on
statements of Senator Poole to establish that debate was hasty)...
230. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
231. See generally United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010); United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906); Motes v.
United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Pettibone v.
United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892);
United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
232. See United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838 (1983)
(using Senator Pool’s speech to ultimately find that 42 U.S.C.S. § 1985(3) does not
reach conspiracies “motivated by economic or commercial animus”); Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971) (using Senator Pool’s speech to support the
argument that a federal statute covered private conspiracies because “Congress must
deal with individuals[,] not States. It must punish the offender against the rights of
the citizen.”); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (using Senator
Pool’s speech to rebut the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant
somehow to limit the Civil Rights Act to state action); United States v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 563, 566–67 (1968) (using cases that relied on Senator Pool’s speech to say that §
241 is a statute that encompasses “all of the rights and privileges secured to citizens
by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United States.”) (emphasis in
original); Duane v. Geico, 37 F.3d 1036, 1042 (4th Cir. 1994) (using Pool’s speech to
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This lack of attention might signal that Price settled so decisively the
statute’s meaning that further reference to the speech would be
superfluous. But what did Price really settle?
As we have said, it decided that the indictment charging a federally
proscribed conspiracy on the part of Goodwin, Chaney, and Schwerner’s
killers alleged sufficient state action. But neither Price nor Price and
Guest taken together settled the question whether state action was
required to give the federal government authority to prosecute
conspiracies or actions to inhibit the exercise of civil rights. Nor did they
lay to rest decisively the question whether Congress intended to
exercise—and whether Congress has—the power to protect people’s
rights that are not “uniquely federal.”
The full text of Senator Pool’s speech goes directly to both of these
still unanswered questions. Why did Marshall append the full text of
the speech to the government’s brief?233 And why did Fortas append the
full brief to the Court’s opinion, adding a puzzling footnote saying that
it was appended “only to show that the Senator clearly intended § 241
to cover Fourteenth Amendment rights.”234 Senator Pool sounds the
People’s narrative of full federal protection of civil rights and insists on
the federal government’s power to proceed in doing so against
individuals as well as against States:
That the United States Government has the right to go into the
States and enforce the fourteenth and the fifteenth
amendments is, in my judgment, perfectly clear, by appropriate
legislation that shall bear upon individuals. . . . I believe that
the United States has the right, and that it is an incumbent
duty upon it, to go into the States to enforce the rights of the
citizens against all who attempt to infringe upon those rights
when they are recognized and secured by the Constitution of
the country. If we do not possess that right the danger to the
liberty of the citizen is great indeed in many parts of this
Union.235
support the argument that “section 16 of the 1870 Act prohibited private
discrimination against aliens”); United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 1987)
(using Pool’s speech to show that Congress’s original intent in enacting § 241 was to
“secur[e] and protec[t] the liberty of the citizen”); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581, 593
(3d Cir. 1966) (using Pool’s speech to show that “Congress intended the Civil Rights
Acts to be applicable to every person as citizen and not as state officer”).
233. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3611–3613 (1870) (remarks
of Sen. Pool of North Carolina on sponsoring Section 6 of the Enforcement Act of 1870),
reprinted in Appendix to United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 807–20 (1966).
234. Price, 383 U.S. at 805 n.19.
235. Appendix to Price, 383 U.S. at 819 (emphasis added).
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Here we have a post-Civil War vision, not of reform, but of hugely
consequential reconstruction of the federation that was conceived under
the proposition that all people are created equal, but designed to preserve
the freedom of private persons to enslave other human beings. Here we
have a People’s narrative of national protection of human rights:
I believe that we have a perfect right under the Constitution of
the United States, not only under these three amendments, but
under the general scope and features and spirit of the
Constitution itself, to go into any of these States for the purpose
of protecting and securing liberty. I admit that when you go
there for the purpose of restraining liberty, you can go only
under delegated powers in express terms; but to go into the
States for the purpose of securing and protecting the liberty of
the citizen and the rights and immunities of American
citizenship is in accordance with the spirit and whole object of
the formation of the Union and the national Government.236
Granted, we are talking about the opinion of one Congressman,
albeit the sponsor and drafter of important federal antiterrorism
legislation. But we are not talking about the opinion of a Radical
Republican. John Pool grew up and resided throughout his life on a
North Carolina plantation. He was opposed to secession, but not an
antislavery advocate. He was persistently active in fighting the Klan,
both with federal force and with state forces. In his heart of hearts,
Senator Pool may well have preferred that States have full and
exclusive power to define and protect civil rights. He understood,
however, the need for change and joined the Republican Party in part
out of “fear that estates would be confiscated . . . and divided among
the blacks unless conservative Unionists like himself accepted the
political changes demanded by Congress and controlled the course of
reconstruction in the state.”237
The possibility of Senator Pool’s ambivalence is no justification for
watering down the meaning of the statutes he sponsored, or of the
Amendments pursuant to which they were passed. As we have shown,
there has been a persistent tendency to interpret the Reconstruction
statutes and Amendments narrowly owing to the fact that they were
approved in a time of upheaval. But, as Pool’s words reveal, a substantial

236. Id. at 812.
237. DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, VOL. 5 119 (William S. Powell
ed., 1994).
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post-bellum reorganization of federal, state and people power was
deliberately undertaken and fully comprehended. This reorganization
meant that where the liberty of the People was threatened, the national
government had independent authority and responsibility to respond. As
Pool put it, for the federal government “to go into the States for the
purpose of securing and protecting the liberty of the citizen and the
rights and immunities of American citizenship is in accordance with
the spirit and whole object of the formation of the Union and the
national Government.”238
III. LOST OPPORTUNITIES: THE CONFEDERATE NARRATIVE IN MODERN
DOCTRINE
When we look to cases after Price and Guest, we find a significant
pattern: we see revivals of the Confederate narrative both within and
outside the field of civil rights, with mantras to the liberty-enhancing
function of states’ rights protections prominently repeated. On the
other hand, we see no direct critique of the Confederate premise that
the People’s liberty depends primarily on states’ autonomy and little
trace of the People’s Reconstruction narrative that found voice with the
revival of Senator Pool’s defense of the Enforcement Act. We do see
signs of brooding within the Court about the reach of federal power to
protect civil rights, but that brooding no longer references the People’s
story of a genuine reconstruction to address the contradictions that
were inherent in the Founders’ compromise with slavery.
It is beyond the scope of this article to analyze the nearly fifty years
of Supreme Court federalism jurisprudence since the 1960s. It must
suffice here to identify significant re-emergences of the Confederate
narrative and moments of lost opportunity–moments when defense of
the federal government as a guardian of civil rights lacked the
persuasive weight of a People’s account of Reconstruction. To that end,
we discuss four cases: City of Boerne v. Flores, Morrison v. Brzonkala,
Shelby County v. Holder, and Obergefell v. Hodges.239
A. The Confederate Narrative Surfaces in a Struggle Over the
Separation of Federal Powers
City of Boerne must be addressed in any discussion of more recent

238. Appendix to Price, 383 U.S. at 812.
239. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct.
2612 (2013); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997).
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civil rights doctrine. It established the principle that congressional
measures authorized by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement
Clause must be “congruent and proportional” to the injury Congress
seeks to prevent or remedy.240 We do not address here the fit between
notions of congruence and proportionality and the analysis of federal
anti-discrimination measures. For present purposes, we regard Boerne
as an atypical civil rights case that improbably, but consequentially,
evoked a revival of the Confederate narrative.
Boerne involved much congressional and judicial sword-rattling
and is best understood as a case about the separation of judicial and
legislative powers. The Court had ruled, in Employment Division v.
Smith,241 that a State could deny unemployment benefits to an
employee who had been discharged as a result of having used peyote in
a religious ceremony. Breaking precedent, the Court found the State’s
action permissible because its sanction against peyote use was broad
and neutral, rather than directed specifically at a religious practice.242
In response, Congress took the combative step of passing a law for the
explicit purpose of altering the doctrine the Court had announced in
reaching its result.243 Acting under its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement powers, Congress legislated a standard of review that the
Smith Court had expressly rejected. In what it called the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), Congress decreed that governments’
facially neutral laws could not substantially burden the free exercise of
religion except in furtherance of a compelling interest and through the
use of minimally drastic means.244

240.
241.
(1990).
242.
243.

City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876–90
Id.
The legislation announced congressional findings that

(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, . . . the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious
exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and (5) the compelling
interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior
governmental interests.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4)–(5) (2000). The Religious Freedom Restoration Act’s stated
purposes were: “(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially
burdened.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2000).
244. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2000).
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RFRA was challenged in City of Boerne245 as too sweeping and
disproportionate a response to the Congressional mission of securing
religious freedom. The Court’s response was more elaborate than it
might have been. The Court devised a facially reasonable
proportionality and congruence test for determining whether Congress
had acted more broadly than the risk of constitutional injury warranted
and applied that test to hold RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the
states. But it went further. It offered the inessential assertion that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s drafters had considered and rejected a
proposal to give Congress broad civil rights enforcement powers,
thereby reviving the Confederate narrative’s call for restraint of federal
power.246
In what has become a sharply controverted account of
Reconstruction politics,247 the opinion describes debate—both on the
floor of Congress and in the press—concerning the first proposed
version of the Enforcement Clause. In the course of that debate,
opponents of the proposed clause complained that it disturbed too much
the balance of federal and state power. The initially proposed clause
gave Congress power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and
property.”248 The version ultimately adopted provided that “Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.”249 Discerning differences between the reach of the first
proposal and the reach of the adopted Enforcement Clause is a complex
and indeterminate interpretive task. The Court’s conclusion that the
adopted clause gave Congress significantly less—or any less—
authority than did the first proposal is at best controversial.250

245. The city had denied the application of a church situated in an historic district
to expand its premises, and the church had offered RFRA in defense of its right to
expand. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
246. Id. at 520 - 23.
247. See generally Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002) (arguing that the Court in City of Boerne’s
narrow construction of Congress’s authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not supported by the history of that constitutional amendment); Ruth Colker &
James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85–86 (2001).
248. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.,
1034 (1866)).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
250. Colker, supra note 258 at 817; Colker & Brudney, supra note 258 at 85–86;
see also Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REV. 163, 169–80 (1998); Steven
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Moreover, it is not clear whether the 1866 debate was about who had
the authority to define or who had the authority to enforce rights
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s first section: At least some
who spoke against the first version of the Enforcement Clause spoke or
voted against the notion that the Federal government should have any
civil rights enforcement power at all.251 As we will see, the Court’s
unnecessary and questionable rehashing of Reconstruction history
foretold a retreat from the vision Marshall and Fortas had offered of
the power shifts and new constitutional understandings that followed
on Union victory in the Civil War.
B. The Confederate Narrative Holds Fast in a Case Involving Gender
Subordination
The People’s narrative incorporates a large Fourteenth
Amendment story of human rights, whereas the Confederate narrative
incorporates a minimalist Fourteenth Amendment story of freeing
slaves. In light of this distinction, we would expect the People’s
narrative to be prominent when groups other than slaves and their
descendants claimed rights under the Reconstruction Amendments.
We therefore turn, in this subsection to a case involving women’s rights
and, in the next, to a case involving sexual minorities.
Brzonkala,252 a case involving the civil rights of women, was
decided in the year 2000, but judicial narrowing of federal power had
been signaled earlier when, in United States v. Lopez, the Court decided
that Congress lacked the power to prohibit the carrying of guns in
school zones.253 Lopez was decided under the Commerce Clause, and
was arguably of little relevance to questions of Federal authority
pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments, but both the Commerce
Clause and the Enforcement Clause were relied upon when Congress
enacted the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),254 the statute at

A. Engel, Note, The McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne
v. Flores and the Original Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 118 (1999).
251. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1087 (1866) (including remarks of
opposition by Rep. Davis); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2545 (1866) (including
the “nay” votes to the Amendment); ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY:
THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND THE SUPREME COURT 40 (1960) (describing Rep.
Andrew Rogers as an “extreme opponent” of the Fourteenth Amendment).
252. The case is usually cited, as it was captioned in the Supreme Court, as United
States v. Morrison. We follow the feminist convention of referencing the case in the
text by the name of its original plaintiff. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
601 (2000).
253. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
254. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (2012).
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issue in Brzonkala.255 Deciding that VAWA exceeded congressional
authority when it created a civil action for gender-motivated acts of
violence, the Court looked to both clauses, and, to the detriment of
doctrinal precision, Commerce Clause jurisprudence influenced the
Court’s thinking in both Constitutional contexts.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court to invalidate the provision
of VAWA under which Christy Brzonkala had sought judgment and
damages for rape, relied principally on Lopez for his Commerce Clause
analysis.256 In deciding that creation of the civil cause of action on a
claim of rape exceeded congressional authority, he intoned the
Confederate narrative’s theme that decentralization of power is the
People’s best protection against tyranny saying, “the Framers crafted
the federal system of Government so that the people’s rights would be
secured by the division of power[,]” 257 and repeated a caution from
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the Lopez case against blurring “the
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority.”258
For his analysis of the reach of federal power under the
Reconstruction Amendments, Rehnquist, speaking for five, announced
the Court bound by two of its most crippling late nineteenth century
assaults on federal power to protect civil rights: United States v. Harris
and the Civil Rights Cases.259 The Rehnquist opinion went on to repeat
a version of the Confederate narrative: it spoke of limitations placed
upon congressional power to enforce civil rights that were necessary,
not because they were explicitly set out in the Amendments, and not
because of a context-specific assessment that decentralization was
preferable, but “to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating
the Framers’ carefully crafted balance of power between the States and
the National Government.”260 The challenged VAWA provision
consequently fell.261
Four dissenting Justices questioned the majority’s Enforcement
Clause reasoning, but stopped short of resolving the Enforcement
Clause question.262 They distinguished Harris and the Civil Rights
Cases on the ground that neither involved a federal statute that was

255. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601.
256. Id. at 615–19.
257. Id. at 616 n.7.
258. Id. at 611 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
259. Id. at 621–22.
260. Id. at 620.
261. Id. at 627.
262. Id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Despite my doubts about the majority's §
5 reasoning, I need not, and do not, answer the § 5 question, which I would leave for
more thorough analysis if necessary on another occasion.”).
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explicitly remedial of unconstitutional State actions or failures.263 They
expressed some comfort with a model in which state and federal powers
might be used in pursuit of a common goal of protecting the People’s
liberty,264 but they failed to address the People’s decision in the 1860s to
alter the Founders’ design and enhance federal power with respect to
peoples’ rights. The Confederate narrative commanded a majority, and
the Peoples’ narrative was truncated and muted.
C. The Confederate Narrative Justifies Voting Rights Retrenchment
Our account of 1960s civil rights activism and the judicial
brooding it immediately spawned neglects an important dimension of
the protesters’ work and their impact on federalism jurisprudence.
Protecting the franchise was a central goal of Southern civil rights
activism of the time; voter registration was a central function of the
young people from across the country who joined Freedom Summer;
and black political participation was a key target of Southern
supremacist terror. This activism inspired passage of the 1964 Voting
Rights Act, prohibiting specified voting practices traditionally used to
exclude black voters and authorizing the federal government to “preclear” changes in state voting laws or practices to assure that the
changes were not an impediment to minority voting. 265 The law was
repeatedly challenged and repeatedly upheld in decisions approving
remedial
and
prophylactic
legislation
under
Congress’s
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority.266
That pattern changed in 2012 with Shelby County v. Holder. Here
Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, embellished the Confederate
narrative, elevating the status of States to both horizontal and
vertical sovereignty,267 and invalidated the Voting Rights Act’s
preclearance measures as extraordinary interferences with States’
rights of equal sovereign power.268 Four Justices dissented in Shelby
County. The dissent comprehensively reviewed the Congressional
record supporting extension of the preclearance formula, prior rulings
regarding the standard by which Congressional enforcement choices

263. Id. at 664–65.
264. Id. at 665.
265. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10304 (Supp. II 2014).
266. Lopez v. Monterey Cty., 525 U.S. 266, 269 (1999); City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 187 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 541 (1973).
267. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2622–25 (2013).
268. Id. at 2631. Justice Roberts had introduced the concept of “equal sovereignty”
in an earlier voting rights case. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557
U.S. 193, 203 (2009).
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should be made, and the questionable path to a doctrine of equal
sovereignty.269 The dissent did not offer, however, the historical
narrative that supports giving Congress the broad authority it
exercised when it passed and repeatedly reauthorized the Voting
Rights Act. In other words, the dissent failed evoke the cruel lesson of
slavery: that majoritarian political processes can yield results that
violate the human rights principles that bind us as a nation.
D. Rights of Sexual Minorities Are Affirmed, but the People’s
Narrative Goes Unspoken—and the Confederate Narrative Continues
to Sound
In a movement reminiscent of extralegal slave marriages270 and of
civil rights sit-ins of the 1960s, lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual
(LGBT) people formed families, while simultaneously enacting and
claiming a constitutional right of family union. When the right of their
families to legal recognition came to the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges,
the Court did not equivocate as it has done in so many African-American
civil rights cases It did not resort to technicalities. It relied squarely on
the People’s right to reasonable autonomy in the formation of families to
hold that every state must recognize same-sex marriages.271
Obergefell’s vindication of nationally conferred and nationally
enforced civil rights was a significant doctrinal move, but the Court’s
exercise of federal power was not defended, as it might have been, in
terms of a People’s Reconstruction narrative. Vindication built on a
People’s Reconstruction narrative was, however, readily available to the
Court, for the constitutionalization of family rights was an explicit
objective of the Reconstruction Congress.272 It was well understood that
the end of slavery would mean the end of deprivations of family integrity
and autonomy;273 scholars had firmly established that slavery’s denial of

269. Shelby Cty., 133 U.S. at 2635–38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
270. COOPER DAVIS, supra note 155, at 30–40, 42–49.
271. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015)(“the right to marry is a
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person”).
272. See Brief for Experiential Learning Lab at New York University School of
Law as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15–18, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571 & 14-574)..(Obergefell Amicus). For a
comprehensive account of congressional acknowledgement during Reconstruction
Amendment debates that freedom required restoration of family rights, including
marriage rights, see Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe
v. Wade, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 299 (1993).
273. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 82, 38th Cong. (1864) (“Joint Resolution to encourage
enlistments and to promote the efficiency of the military forces of the United States.”);
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1180 (1864); CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess.
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family recognition conferred a civic and social death that was antithetical
to free citizenship; and even former Confederate states had recognized
post-Emancipation that the right of marriage recognition was an
attribute of free citizenship.274
Although the majority shied away from the People’s Reconstruction
narrative, dissenters from the Court’s result each relied on the
Confederate story that the People’s rights are best protected by
protection of States’ rights. Justice Roberts decried “stealing”
decisionmaking about same-sex marriage rights from “the People” and
“from the hands of state voters” and accused the majority of
accumulating power at “the expense of the people.”275 Justice Scalia
accused the majority of robbing the People of the liberty to govern
themselves.276 Justice Thomas charged the majority with “wiping out
with a stroke of the keyboard the results of the political process in over
30 States,”277 and Justice Alito accused it of usurping “the constitutional
right of the people to decide whether to keep or alter the traditional
understanding of marriage.”278
The dissenters were correct, of course, in saying that the majority
had overridden a number of state political processes. This was inevitable
and right, for the People may legitimately seek to trump both state and
federal legislative processes. This does not mean that their claim of civil

64 (1864); CHARLES K. WHIPPLE, THE FAMILY RELATION, AS AFFECTED BY SLAVERY 3,
9, 11–13 (1858); HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE ANTISLAVERY MEASURES OF THE
THIRTY-SEVENTH AND THIRTY-EIGHTH UNITED STATES CONGRESSES, 1861–64, at 313–
27 (1864); Amy Dru Stanley, Instead of Waiting for the Thirteenth Amendment: The
War Power, Slave Marriage, and Inviolate Human Rights, 115 AM. HIST. REV. 732,
732–33 (2010).
274. Upon emancipation, the former Confederate states recognized that "domestic
relations of that class of persons who have been recently released from the condition
of slaves and given the rights and privileges of free persons" was "of great importance."
McReynolds v. State, 45 Tenn. 18, 20 (1867). In response, they found that, "justice and
humanity, as well as sound public policy, demanded legislation giving legal sanction,
as far as possible, to the moral obligations of [former slave marriages], and rendering
legitimate the offspring thereof." Jennings v. Webb, 8 App. D.C. 43, 54 (1896). Thus,
between 1865 and 1870, all eleven states of the former confederacy revised their laws
to recognize marriage between former slaves. See Darlene C. Goring, The History of
Slave Marriage in the United States, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299, 316 n. 87, 316 n.100,
324 n.123, 325 n.127, 326 n.131, 331 n.167, 332, 334 n.185, 335 n.193 & 336 n.196
(2006) (compiling Tennessee (1866), Louisiana (1868) Virginia (1866), South Carolina
(1865, modified in 1872), North Carolina (1866), Florida (1866), Arkansas (1866),
Mississippi (1865), and Georgia (1866) statutes respectively); Washington, supra note
3 (describing Alabama (1865) and Texas (1870) statutes).,
275. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612, 2615, 2624–25 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
278. Id. at 2642 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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and human rights violation disregards political process: their claim
summons the people’s decision, at moments of constitutional enactment
or amendment, that majoritarian politics can not be permitted to
function without limitations based on respect for human rights. Justice
Kennedy made this point by summoning oft quoted tenets of
constitutional democracy:
An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection
when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees
and even if the legislature refuses to act. The idea of the
Constitution “was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts.”279 This is why
“fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections.”280
Justice Kennedy’s argument might have been strengthened by
explicit recognition that the 1787 constitutional order was
reconstructed for the precise purpose of assuring that fundamental
rights be understood as supervening principles to be applied by courts.
CONCLUSION
It is a consequential and insufficiently acknowledged part of our
intellectual history that anti-Federalist ideas about the libertyenhancing effects of local control have been used repeatedly to paper
over the contradiction between slaveholding and other forms of
subordination on the one hand and equal respect for all people on the
other. Chief Justice Roberts, author of the Shelby County majority
opinion and author of the opinion that constitutes one of two
precedential links to the opinion’s idea of equal sovereignty, has
played a significant role in the retelling of the Confederate antiFederalist narrative and its rationale.
In the majority opinion upholding a provision of the Affordable
Care Act in NFIB v. Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts included a wholly
unnecessary preamble.281 This preamble, not joined by any other
member of the Court, was ostensibly offered as a statement of

279.
280.
638).
281.

West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Id. at 2605–06 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (citing Barnette, 319 U.S. at
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577–80 (2012).

2017]

THE CONFEDERATE NARRATIVE

357

principles governing congressional power to enact a national medical
care system that sustains itself by making demands on States and on
the People. The Roberts preamble is an ode to the importance of
limiting Federal power. It essentially recites what we have called the
Cruikshank creed: the preamble refers at length to the history of the
nation’s Founding, but never to its post-bellum Reconstruction; it
reiterates the Confederate rationale without explanation or
qualification;282 and it makes no mention of the impressive body of
scholarly work in the fields of law, decision theory, philosophy and
political science addressing the circumstances under which
decentralization of government power is and is not in the interests of
a principled People.283
As we have shown, the Confederate Reconstruction narrative of
modest reform and preservation of States’ rights can easily go
unchallenged. A highly distinguished historian of Reconstruction
addressed the legal community in 2012 to point out that the narrative
of modest reform “remains embedded in the law long after the
intellectual foundations of that historical outlook have been
demolished.”284 He argued, and we agree, that a critical reassessment
of the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the tensions between the
People’s freedom and States’ autonomy is long overdue.285
The Court’s willingness to defer to States on fundamental
questions of dignity sets the United States apart from the growing
international consensus that the protection of human rights is the
obligation of every national sovereign, whether composed of federated
states or not.286 A reassessment of Federal authority to protect the

282. See id. at 2578 (“The independent power of the States also serves as a check
on the power of the Federal Government: ‘By denying any one government complete
jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the
individual from arbitrary power.’” (quoting Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355,
2364 (2011)).
283. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201,
1230-52 (1999); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism in Constitutional Context, 22 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181, 181–93 (1998) (discussing state and local governments as
administrative arms of the federal government).
284. Eric Foner, Reconstruction Revisited: The Supreme Court and the History of
Reconstruction—and Vice-Versa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1592 (2012).
285. Id. at 1585.
286. The United States is a signatory to a number of the core international human
rights instruments, including The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85,
195; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 213 (binding as of Mar. 23, 1976); and The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966,
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people’s rights seemed possible amidst the turmoil of the 1960s when
the people spoke in the streets to enact freedoms that should have
been guaranteed in the 1860s. The flicker of the People’s narrative
that remains from that era should not die. To the end of reviving
robust argument about the effects of the Reconstruction Amendments
on the people’s freedom, we offer this beginning analysis and an
internet site at which one can access relevant cases and other
authorities and exchange views about the shape of our reconstructed
republic.

660 U.N.T.S. 195, 303. These instruments have been ratified by no fewer than one
hundred and sixty nine nation states in “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.” E.g., International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. at 172. However, in ratifying each
of these international treaties, the U.S. raised two broad objections that together
minimize the role of the federal government in protecting human rights. First, in the
name of state sovereignty the U.S. maintains that it does not necessarily recognize the
federal government as the primary and final defender on human rights. Thus, the
ratification statement for each of these conventions states:
[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented
by the Federal Government to the extent that it exercises legislative and
judicial jurisdiction over the matters covered therein, and otherwise by the
state and local governments; to the extent that state and local governments
exercise jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall take
measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end that the competent
authorities of the state or local governments may take appropriate measures
for the fulfillment of the Covenant.
140 Cong. Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994); 138 Cong. Rec. S4784-01 (daily ed.
April 2, 1992); see also 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (similar, but
not identical, language). Second, the U.S. argues that the substantive provisions of
international human right norms to which it is a signatory are non-self-executing. 140
Cong. Rec. S7364-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994); 138 Cong. Rec. S4782-01 (daily ed. April
2, 1992); 136 Cong. Rec. S17486-01 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990). As a practical matter, this
means that, unless and until Congress enacts specific legislation, the conventions
themselves do not provide independent grounds for litigants to bring claims in federal
courts for violations of the terms of the treaties. See Gay J. McDougall, Toward a
Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International Efforts to
Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 588 (1997); see also
Tara J. Melish, From Paradox to Subsidiarity: The United States and Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 389, 391 (2009) (arguing that, while the U.S.
typically encourages governments to fully incorporate human rights treaties into
domestic political and judicial processes, at home we have tended, in the name of state
sovereignty and other doctrines, to shield ourselves from similarly committing to fully
accepting international human rights norms as federal obligations).
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APPENDIX A: GENEALOGY OF RECONSTRUCTION CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
Although the Supreme Court did strike down many portions of the
Civil Rights Acts passed during Reconstruction, other portions of
those Acts remain in effect today. However, those portions have been
subsequently renamed and renumbered in the United States Code.
This Appendix traces the path from the original legislation to its
modern codification.
Section 1 of the Citizenship Act,287 which was reenacted
verbatim in Section 16 of the 1870 Act,288 remains in effect and has
been codified as 42 U.S.C. §1981. Today §1981 is understood to ban
both government and private discrimination in the makings of
contracts, and reads in its entirety:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by [W]hite
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to
no other.289
Section 1 of the Citizenship Act and the identical Section 16 of
the Enforcement Act also produced the modern civil rights
provision codified as 42 U.S.C. §1982. Section 1982 is fairly selfexplanatory and reads in its entirety:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens
thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.290

287.
288.
289.
290.

Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
Enforcement Act of 1870, Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (1870).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
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Portions of the Klan Act 291 survived as 42 U.S.C. §1983 and now
reads in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .292
In modern times, §1983 has become the primary vehicle used by
private parties to vindicate their constitutional rights against state
and local government officials. In and of itself, §1983 did not then (and
does not now) create any new substantive right. Rather, it establishes
a cause of action in federal court for damages and injunctive relief
against state and local officials who violate any constitutional or
statutory federal right.
Sections of the Klan Act also survived as 42 U.S. §1985(3) and
today read in relevant part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go
in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for
the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing
to all persons within such State or Territory the equal
protection of the laws . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in
this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or
cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages
occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or

291.
292.

Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871, Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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more of the conspirators.293
At the time of its original passage in 1871, §1985(3) was
specifically aimed at providing a federal remedy against the Klan and
other groups who used violence and intimidation to prevent Blacks in
the South from fully enjoying their freedom. The original provisions
of what is now referred as §1985(3) contained both criminal penalties
and civil sanctions for violation of the Act. Shortly after it was
enacted, the Supreme Court struck down the criminal sanction
provisions of the statute without addressing the constitutionality of
its civil penalties. The statute remained dormant until 1940s when it
was occasionally used to bring civil suits to quell mob violence directed
toward unpopular political groups. Today §1985(3) remains in effect
but, as compared to §§ 1981, 1982 and 1983, is rarely the
determinative in civil rights litigation.

293.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012).
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APPENDIX B: ONLINE DOCTRINAL MAPS
To see visual representations of this Article’s doctrinal argument,
please go to our online appendix or follow the individual links below.
The online appendix includes six interactive maps that chart the
genealogies of key Supreme Court opinions described in the Article.
These genealogies link Supreme Court opinions to Reconstruction
legislation, Constitutional Amendments and historical events. Click
on any of the depicted opinions, laws, amendments, or events to open
a new window containing open-source information about the link.
Sources: Supreme Court opinions are provided by CourtListener
(a free site that provides verbatim opinion text) and by the Court
itself. Reconstruction legislation is represented by documents
gathered through original research. Information about historical
events and constitutional amendments comes from the open-source
repository Wikipedia.
Map Description
Map 1 depicts Part I.A above–The 1787 Order Reconstructed.
Map 2 visualizes Part I.B above – Early Supreme Court Interpretation:
the 1787 Constitutional Order Restored.
Map 3 illustrates Part I.C above–The Competing Interpretation: A New
Charter of Freedom.
Map 4 charts Parts II.A-B above– Assigning the “Occasional
Unpleasant Task” of Civil Rights Enforcement + Protecting the
Performance of Free Citizenship.

Map 5 renders Part II.C above–Confronting a Sharper Cry for Civil
Rights Enforcement.

Map 6 summarizes Parts III.A-D above–Lost Opportunities: The
Confederate Narrative in Modern Doctrine.
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